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Between 1978 and 1983, a number of violent interstate
confrontations in South America, including the
Falklands/Malvinas War, indicated that the continent was
experiencing a period of tension and instability, with a
strong possibility of additional interstate war. Several
South American nations were engaged in armamentism, were
internally unstable, and displayed considerable animosity
towards each other. Meanwhile, U.S. ability to play a
constructive security role appeared greatly diminished.
This thesis examines conflict in South America from a
historical and contemporary viewpoint, analyzing the factors
which have led to wars in the past and may (or may not) do so
in the future. Geopolitics, militarism, arms races and
boundary disputes are discussed, as is the U.S. role in the
region in the past and present; a perspective on a broadened
U.S. military and policy option is included. The conclusion
of the work is that interstate war is not likely in the
foreseeable future, especially while democratic regimes
remain in power.
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I . INTRODUCTION: THE "UNEXPECTED" WAR: FALKLANDS - MALVINAS
The South Atlantic War between Argentina and the United
Kingdom in 1982 caught many by surprise--including the two
participants. It appears that neither side had anticipated
the actions or reactions of the other. The British
withdrawal of forces from the area prior to invasion would
not have taken place if the threat of invasion loomed; and,
the Argentines seriously miscalculated not only Britain's
willingness to defend the islands, but her capability to do
so.
2
The dispute went back to the Eighteenth century, when
Spain and Britain had claimed the islands. After achieving
independence, Argentina established a small settlement on the
islands, which was destroyed by the crew of the American ship
"Lexington" in 1832, in reprisal for the capture of American
sealing vessels. In 1833, British naval forces took over the
islands and expelled the remaining Argentine residents; the
current British presence dates to that time. Argentina never
recognized the legitimacy of British colonial claims,
and repeatedly pressed its case in international fora
.
In 1964, the issue was discussed in the UN Special
3Committee on Decolonization. The UN urged negotiations on
the basis of both decolonization and the interests of the
Also known as the "Falklands/Malvinas War" and the
"Anglo-Argentine War."
^Dov S. Zakheim, "The South Atlantic Conflict:
Strategic, Military, and Technological Lessons", in Alberto
Coll and Anthony Arendt, eds
.
, The Jalklands War (Boston and
London: George Allen & Unwin"^ 1985)
,
p": 160 . See also
Admiral (Ret.) Harry Train's "An Analysis of the
Falklands/Malvinas Islands Campaign" in the Winter 1988 issue
of the Naval War College Review . According to ADM Train, the
ArgentiTTS^ never intended tT5 go to war at: all--witness the
care taken to shed no British blood during the initial
invasion operation.
^Jozef Goldblat and Victor Millan, The
Falklands/Malvinas Conflict: A Spur to Arms Buildups,
(Stockholm; sipri, 1983), p. 5.
islands' inhabitants, and talks between the two countries
began in 1966. Although a few minor agreements were reached
(such as air travel to and from the mainland, petroleum
supplies, and trade facilitation) , no substantive conclusion
could be reached on the sovereignty question. A shooting
incident took place in the area in 197 6 between an Argentine
frigate and a British research vessel, but no serious
consequences followed; talks between the two states
continued. In 1980, the islanders were consulted by Her
Majesty's Government regarding their future; they opted for a
25-year freeze on discussion of the question, rather than for
Argentine sovereignty with a 99-year leaseback by the
4British. Argentina announced that this was unacceptable;
nevertheless, talks continued, with the last being held in
New York in early 1982. A little over a month later,
Argentine military forces landed at Port Stanley.
The war was a costly affair for both sides. The
financial cost to Argentina in expenditures and lost
equipment is unofficially estimated at $850 million, and
casualties are estimated at around 500-750 dead and 800-
1,000 injured. Official British casualty figures are 255
dead, and 777 injured; financial costs run into the billions
of dollars and long-term defense expenditures continue to
mount
.
4 . . . ...This IS essentially the same type of interim solution
which had apparently worked in the Antarctic; the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959 (ratified by both Argentina and Britain, among
others) merely put off all sovereignty claims without
disputing their merit (Article IV)
.
Lawrence S. Germain, "A Diary of the Falklands
Conflict", in Bruce Watson & Peter Dunn, eds
.
, Military





Ty5~. Getmain contends that the Argentines
landea a 100-man contingent led by Captain Alfredo Astiz on
South Georgia on 26 March, and that this was the first
military act of the war. Other sources (Train) indicate that
reports of the Argentine landing on South Georgia were
exaggerated, and the first military act was the actual
invasion of the Falklands on 2 April.
^Goldblat and Millan, pages 18-23. See also "Britain
Begins War Exercise to Try Out Falkland Fsic] Airport," New
York Times , 8 March 1988; Britain constructed a new tacticarT^
aircraft capable airfield at Port Stanley in the Falklands at
The unexpectedness and scope of the war generated much
controversy about its causes and implications. Various
reasons for the outbreak of the war have been advanced.
7These include anti-colonialism, long-standing disputes over
sovereignty rights, resource competition,
militarism/armamentism and geopolitical yearnings, and
attempts by both the Argentine and British governments to
o
bolster popular support at home. In addition, external
factors such as mediation or an effective international
system which could have helped to prevent the war or to
negotiate peace were absent or failed.
Many of these reasons or preconditions can be found in
other existing relationships among countries in the region,
leaving open the possibility for intrahemispheric conflict in
addition to Argentina's quarrel with an exohemispheric
nation. The South Atlantic War has therefore been postulated
by some analysts as a harbinger, if not an additional
rationale or cause, for continued and widespread near-term
9
armed conflict m South America. On the other hand, there
a cost of over $670 million. This figure did not include
aircraft or upkeep expenses at such a remote location.
7 . . . .Buenos Aires ob^iected repeatedly to any solution which
would not have resulted in Argentine sovereignty; in other
words, the issue of British imposition of colonial control
over the inhabitants was not an issue. Newsweek, 10 May
1982. p. 37. The Argentine stance wa'S that the
decolonization principle and the integrity of territorial
sovereignty were superior to the self-determination
grinciple. See Lowell S. Gustafson, "The Principle of Self-
etermination and the Dispute About Sovereignty Over the
Falkand Islands." Inter-American Economic Affairs, Volume 37
No. 4, Spring 1987: Pages 81-82.
Q
Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, Argentina: The






T&t~. m theit doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist
"analysis" of the conflict, the authors agree on its
definition as "a conventional war between two bourgeois
states to consolidate their unpopular democratic regimes."
They also consider the possibility that it represents ton the
part of Argentina) "a form of imperialist drive similar to
that of Japan, Russia, and the U.S. before 1914."
Q
See, for example, Augusto Varas' Militarization and
the Arms Race in Latin America (Boulderl Wescview Fress,
1985) . vatas—states Vp~. 54^ that "paradoxically, .the
relaxation of international tension [the Cold War] has given
are those who postulate that the war was an anomaly in a
region with a long tradition of interstate peace, and that
the possibility of further wars in the area is remote.
In the past, especially since World War II, South
America has not been a conflict-prone region relative to the
rest of the world. Recent developments, including the South
Atlantic War and continent-wide arms buildups since 1966,
have led to concern over whether this trend might not be
changing. Using a historical approach and a review of
current literature, this paper will explore the various
factors which could originate or contribute to conflict in an
area of significance to U.S. interests, in an attempt to
determine the current and projected risk for armed
confrontation in South America.
rise to new tensions... that may lead to conflict." Michael
A. Morris and Victor Millan in Controlling Latin American
Conflicts (Boulder: Westview PresS^^—1983)—cltS (pagss—1—5r2T
rhe t alklands/Malvinas War as an indicator that Latin America
has become a "conflict-prone region." In the Introduction to
)day . . . would p]
isolated event that could not be repeated in some
battlefield of the Western Hemisphere."
10David C. Gompert, Deputy Secretary of State for
Political Affairs under Secretary of State Alexander Haig,
calls the war "an aberrant blip on the radar scope of worla
affairs." (Coll and Arend, p. 107) . For one of the best
analyses of this viewpoint, see Walter Little's
"International Conflict in Latin America" Journal of
International Affairs
,
Volume 63 No. 4, Autumn 19BT: XJn tTT^
Left, Dabar aTK3 Lorenzano believe that Argentina's defeat
precluded an eventual clash between the Argentinian regional
imperialists, aided by the Bolivian and Peruvian
bourgeoisies, against Chile. They also foresaw, however, the
specter of "a new repressive demagogic-nationalist movement
fuelling the flames of fratricidal war on the continent," as
well as an auspicious climate for the new regional powers "to
exert diplomatic pressures on weaker countries^' and an
acceleration of the regional arms race.
II . BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT IN SOUTH AMERICA; THE 19TH CENTURY
A. THE COLONIAL AND POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIODS
Throughout its colonial history. South America was
generally unmarred by interregional conflicts, chiefly due to
its governmental and cultural homogeneity. Brazil's relative
geographic isolation from her neighbors and the peaceful
resolution of disagreements between higher levels of
government in Spain and Portugal prevented any international
wars. Aside from periodic insurrections, the only cases of
transnational conflict were spinoffs from the European wars,
based on religious and political/economic disputes among the
European powers rather than on any purely American interests
.
The struggle for independence by the native-born
inhabitants of Iberian America had its roots to a great
extent in European trends and struggles; Napoleon's invasion
of Spain and the replacement of the legitimate Spanish king
by Napoleon's brother Joseph acted as catalysts for
12 ...
nationalist sentiment in the colonies. The patriotic ideas
themselves were a distillation of European revolutionary
thought which had little to do either in theory or in
application with then extant Latin American conditions.
The Treaty of Tordesillas, 1494, established a line
of demarcation from a meridian running 100 leagues west of
Cape Verde to between 4 8 and 4 9 degrees longitude as
Portuguese territory, and land to the west of the line as
Spanish soil. This was updated—very much in Portugal's
favor—by the Treaty of Madrid (1750) , which established two
criteria: a) uti possidetis (last possessor) and b) natural
boundaries (mountain peaks, the center of a river, etc.).
Portugal thus obtained over twice the territory it nad been
?ranted at Tordesillas. The Treaty of Madrid was annulled in761, but its principles were incorporated into the Treaty of
San Ildefonso in 1777. Unfortunately, key provisions in the
treaty for charting and mapping surveys were never carried
out. For a full discussion of tne treaties and their impact,
see Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions and Confl icts in
South America (Cambridge, MA: HArvStd,—1938)
,
pags 325.
12 ...Peter Calvert, Boundary Disputes m Latin Ameri ca
(London: Institute for Study Of Conflict,—1983)
,
page 3.
The turbulent period which convulsed the Spanish Empire
saw wars directed against the colonial power' s agents in the
New World rather than among any particular areas or local
populations. In fact, this period was characterized by grand
schemes of multi-regional unity, such as Bolivar's plans for
a Gran Colombia encompassing present-day Colombia, Venezuela
and Ecuador. The plans failed after independence had been
achieved, as it became evident that each area of the defunct
Empire felt imbued with its own distinct national character--
or when one particular region saw its interests better
served by having many weaker neighbors rather than a single
13
strong one.
Brazil was a significant exception to this process.
Portugal was less a military-autocratic state than Spain, and
Brazil was settled rather than conquered (the aboriginals
were few in number and were not culturally advanced)
;
independence came in a relatively bloodless manner, with the
heir to Portugal's Braganza throne declaring himself the
14 • .
ruler. The military were relatively unimportant during the
first forty years of the Empire.
1
3
This was best demonstrated by Chile's persistent—and
successful—efforts to separate Upper from Lower Peru by
destroying the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation. The
resulting nations (modern Peru and Bolivia) thus broke ties
which had bound them to each other culturally and
geographically since the Inca Empire. See John Edwin Fagg's
atin America: A General History (New York: Macmillan, 1963),
pag63 566-7.
14 ....Robert Wesson, ed.. The Latin American Military
Institution (New York: Praeger, 1986), page Mil.
B. NINETEENTH CENTURY CONFLICTS
15Following independence, major wars occurred only
sporadically; the greatest in terms of economic effects and
enduring bitterness were the War of the Triple Alliance
between Paraguay on one side, and Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay on the other; and the War of the Pacific, pitting
Chile against Peru and Bolivia. Lesser confrontations also
took place between Peru and Ecuador, the short-lived
Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation and Chile, Brazil and
Argentina (over Uruguay) and among European and South
American nations.
1 . The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870)
The bloodiest war in post-colonial South America was
initiated principally by the colossal ambitions of Francisco
Solano L6pez, Paraguay's colorful and bloodthirsty
dictator. He used Brazilian intervention in one of
Uruguay's frequent factional squabbles as a pretext to
declare war on Brazil in 1865 after the empire refused his
ultimatum to withdraw from Uruguay. The Paraguayan dictator
proposed to send an army into Uruguay and then invade
Southern Brazil, but this meant marching through Argentina;
1 5 The definitions of the terms "war" and "regional
conflict' vary, with at least one author, Quincy Wright,
claiming that war is a military confrontation tnat includes a
declaration of war and the involvement of fifty thousand
persons,; given the scope and size of South American
militaries, governments and populations, such a definition
would barely encompass the Anglo-Argentine Conflict. It
would also rail to include the Korean and Vietnam conflicts,
which after all were undeclared. For the purposes of this
paper, a better working definition (proposed by CDR Michael
McCune. USN in a February 1988 lecture at the Naval Post-
Graduate School, Monterey) is that at a minimum it involves
direct military confrontation between two separate recognized
nation states, and one thousand casualties. Thus, civil
"wars" and other forms of internal violence will not be
treated here except as they affect transnational conflict.
1 6 Ever the revisionist, E. Bradford Burns claims in his
Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History (Englewood
Cliffs,—Nj; prentlcs-Hall,—1982), paoe ill,, that the war was
threatened the balance of power in the Plata basin. Burns
apparently considers aggression a manifestation of national
development
.
when Argentina denied him passage, L6pez declared war on that
state as well.
While on the surface L6pez' actions seem suicidal,
they were not entirely unfounded; while L6pez had the largest
standing army in South America, the Brazilian Empire "was so
disjointed Lopez had reason to believe it could never put an
1 7
effective army in the field." Uruguay was riven by
factional disputes; Argentina had no love for Brazil, and
also had a history of factional strife and disunity. Through
poor leadership on Lopez' part and the sheer weight of
numbers on the allied side, the war turned against the
Paraguayans and eventually ended up in the near extermination
of Paraguay's population by the time the war ended in 1870.
Burns points out the results of the conflict: first,
it opened the Plata River network to international commerce
and travel, an important factor for Brazil. It also
established the identity of Uruguay and a vastly weakened
Paraguay as permanent buffer states between the two larger
countries; neither Brazil nor Argentina intervened in the two
smaller nations again. Although these may not have been the
motivating factors behind the war, they give it a
geopolitical significance that cannot be overlooked. Another
result was the huge increase in the Argentine and Brazilian
military, followed by creation of large standing armies in
the two giants of South America, which previously only had
token national forces.
2. The War of the Pacific (1879-1884)
This war saw several innovations for the continent,
not least among them a prolonged naval phase and a well-
orchestrated amphibious campaign. The participants were
Peru and Bolivia, allied against Chile. The cause of the war
was a dispute over exploitation of nitrate deposits by
Chilean and European entrepreneurs in an area claimed by
Bolivia. When Bolivia increased taxes on the nitrates as a
-'-'^ Fagg, pages 584-586.
preliminary step toward nationalization of the deposits,
Chile sent a military force to occupy the Bolivian port of
Antofagasta. Popular outcry in Peru, coupled with a "secret"
treaty signed in 1873 which obligated Peru to come to
Bolivia's defense, led to declarations of war.
After several engagements, Chile won control of the
seas and proceeded in a series of landings up the coast to
defeat the allied armies. Mediation efforts by the United
States were unsuccessful, since Peru and Bolivia refused to
give up claim to any territory Chile had "conquered." The
Chileans captured Lima in 1881, and by 1884 extracted a peace
on their terms. Bitterness over the war and its consequences
1
8
remains a problem in relations among the three states. As
in the War of the Triple Alliance, this conflict also saw an
enormous increase in the regular armies of the belligerents,
to a degree that would have been unthinkable prior to the
19war.
3 . Other Wars
There were several less notable wars and
confrontations on the continent during the Nineteenth
century. They included the wars of the Peruvian-Bolivian
Confederation (1826-1839) / although fought chiefly by
Peruvian and Bolivian factions, this series of conflicts was
largely decided by Chilean intervention to prevent the
1
8
The consequences can be summarized as: 1) The loss of
Bolivia's access to the sea; 2) Peru's military humiliation
and loss of territory; 3) reinforcing Chile's hubris and
aggressiveness. Wesson (page 145) states that as a result of
her victorious wars, an important part of Chile' s military
doctrine is "a militant nationalism that emphasizes the
possibility of armed conflict with neighboring countries...
and the use of diplomatic and military means to prevent a
hostile combination of neighboring countries."
1
9
The Chilean prewar army amounted to some 2,500
officers and men, principally devoted to internal security
and Indian wars. By war's end, Chile had an army of 45,000.
The large and weir-equipped army was retained and turned
against the Araucanian Indians after the war, expeditiously
terminating a "problem" which had plagued Spanish and Chilean
administrations for 330 years. Peruvian-Bolivian revanchism
and the Argentine "threat" kept subsequent governments from
reducing the size of the armed forces. See Andrea T.






formation of a coalition among neighboring states, which
could potentially isolate Chile or threaten her security.
The series of petty wars between Brazil and Argentina from
1825 to 1828 over the area that eventually became Uruguay can
be characterized as post-independence consolidation rather
than as major war between two organized states.
Another conflict took place in 1860 between Peru and
Ecuador, based principally on conflicting boundary claims in
Amazonian jungle territories. Peru won the war handily, but
the issue remains unresolved (from the Ecuadorian
perspective) to this day.
Last but not least, there were several instances of
intervention by extracontinental forces, including the United
States and Spain, France, and Great Britain. In addition to
the Falklands/Malvinas occupation, the British expressed
dissatisfaction with the treatment of their nationals or
interests on a number of occasions, especially with the more
xenophobic regimes (such as Argentina's Rosas, who ruled
1829-1852; the French and British fleets blockaded Buenos
Aires in 1838-40 and 1845-48) . Spain seized the Peruvian
guano-producing Chincha Islands in 1864, and bombarded Callao
and Valparaiso in 1866. The United States sent a debt-
or)
collection naval expedition to Paraguay in 1859.
C. CAUSES OF WAR IN THE 19TH CENTURY
A number of variables have been cited by different
authors to explain the causes underlying international
conflict in general and in Nineteenth century South America
in particular, among them boundary disputes; the
preponderance of the military in most of the nations'
governments; national aggrandizement; national security; and
economics. Overall, however, one of the salient
characteristics of these conflicts is their relative
7 Pelham Horton Box, The Origins of the Paraguayan War.
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1930 /reissued 1967), p. 35.
10
scarcity. It is therefore difficult to make generalizations
or to pinpoint any single factor as the principal causal
agent for the wars; rather, the various conflicts could be
attributed to a number of circumstances. The most promising
avenue of approach is an examination of individual variables
to determine if they apply only to a specific time and place,
or if they can be considered valid in several cases.
1 . Boundary Disputes
Spanish colonial administration encompassed a number
of contradictory or overlapping boundaries; thus borders
based on colonial boundaries were difficult to determine with
any conclusiveness. In 1848, the principal South American
nations agreed at the Congress of Lima to use the Spanish
oundaries extant in 1810 as the basis for delimitation;
however, by 1848, many of the colonial borders had already
been changed by force or circumstance. The agreement to
abide by the colonial boundaries merely served to provide
21
various states with conflicting claims.
Brazil was in an even more tenuous situation
regarding its boundaries; much of its territory was
undetermined due to the ambiguities in the Treaty of San
Ildefonso. Accordingly, the Brazilians used a different
argument, that of actual and historical occupation, as the
rationale for their borders. This was apparently a valid
criterion in international law of the time, which still
recognized right of conquest and the need to occupy a
22territory in order to claim it.
Some of the boundary disputes which were based on
colonially-determined borders were settled peacefully,
through arbitration or negotiation. This was particularly
the case with regard to Brazil; largely through the
diplomatic skills of the Baron of Rio Branco, Brazil was able
to extract concessions and gain title to huge tracts of land
^^ Calvert, p. 5.
^^ Calvert, p. 5.
11
at the expense of almost all Brazil's neighbors. This was
remarkable given the economic significance of much of the
territory in question during the rubber boom late in the
century
.
For the most part, however, boundary disputes
remained an unresolved issue which at times exacerbated
tensions among countries. They were occasionally resurrected
to serve some immediate internal purpose. The only case
where irredentist claims by themselves were the principal
cause of a war was the clash between Peru and Ecuador in
1859; even then, economics and national pride were
contributing factors.
2 . Militarism and Armed Conflict
Another cause cited for wars in Latin America is the
nature of the region's military forces and leadership, and
2 3their participation in government. There seems to be
little validity to this argument, however, since there were
so few wars in spite of the predominance of military regimes
in the region in the Nineteenth Century. If anything, this
factor might have prevented external conflict due to the
considerable internal turmoil which it generated. The lack
of military professionalism (with the attendant power
struggles among the various leaders) , small size of the
armies, poor transportation and logistics infrastructure,
rugged terrain and relatively large national areas made
cross-border conflict a daunting prospect for any military
regime, especially when coupled with political uncertainty at
home
.
Armamentism and military buildups may have played a
role in the conflicts when tied in with other factors; the
same can be said for perceptions of weakness generating a
failure in deterrence, Peru's enlightened despot Ramon
23Alexandre da Souza Costa Barros, "Regional Rivalries
and War Probabilities in South America." Paper presented at
the 1980 Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed
Forces and Society (Chicago: 23-25 Oct, 1981)) .
12
Castilla had built up and professionalized his military
forces when he went to war with Ecuador in 1860. Conversely,
Peru's "secret" treaty of 1873 with Bolivia occurred at a
time when the nation's first civilian president, Manuel
Pardo, was in the process of dismantling much of Peru's not
inconsiderable military capability. By 1878-79, when the
casus belli took place in Atacama, Peru was in no position to
wage a successful war against Chile, and her ally Bolivia was
24
even more militarily weak and backwards. Chile, on the
other hand, had a capable and well-equipped military.
Francisco Lopez also believed he had overwhelming military
power before initiating the War of the Triple Alliance.
While the small number of wars that took place makes
it difficult to establish military capability and arms
purchases as causal factors, both were apparently
characteristic of the various states that started wars
through aggressive behavior in the period. Conversely, a
case could be made for the opposite, with military power
serving as a deterrent; then as now, aggressive acts by
various countries may have been forestalled by fear that such
acts could result in a lost war against a powerful armed
force. The key factor here would be the balance of power
among the key regional players, rather than any individual
buildup.
3 . Economic/Resource Conflict
The outstanding example of a conflict motivated by
the desire to control economic resources is the War of the
Pacific (1879-1884) . Chile, in collusion with British
interests, was able to gain control of the Atacama nitrate
fields in Bolivia and Peru. To a lesser extent, the War of
24 For all his posturing, Bolivian Dictator Hilari6n
Daza also proved to be a craven poltroon. This facet of his
character may have stirred the Chileans to carry out the
initial aggression and carry on with the war.
25 . . . .Marxist analysis views most human activity as
economically motivated, and would undoubtedly ascribe class
conflict as the root for all wars in the region. A broader
perspective is explored in this paper.
13
the Triple Alliance was also fought over resources (access to
the Plata waterways, ripuarian territory) , and ended with
large areas being transferred to the victors for economic
exploitation
.
Intervention by Brazil and Argentina in the
"Cisplatine Province"/Banda Oriental (Uruguay) was outwardly
motivated by competition for resources (land for livestock-
raising) , but ended after British mediation with both sides
agreeing that neither would get the advantage--a unique case
of mutually agreed upon denial rather than acquisition of
resources. The root of the conflict was more likely
traditional Luso-Spanish rivalry in the Plata estuary (making
it a case of national aggrandizement or security) , and not
simply competition over a resource.
Economics can be envisioned as playing a certain role
in determining when a country became an aggressor; Peru,
Paraguay and Chile were experiencing relative economic
prosperity in 1859, 1860 and 1879 respectively, when they
initiated military actions against neighboring states and/or
their allies. There were no major wars started by
desperately poor countries seeking to gain advantage by
plundering a richer neighbor.
4 . Ideological Conflict
The common origins of the various Hispanic republics
under the revolutionary ideology of independence (the
"bolivarian ideal") from Spain initially provided a unifying
character to the ideologies of South American states
.
Although most governments in the region failed to live up to
the lofty ideals of the Liberators (indeed, many of the
participants in the wars for independence later betrayed
those ideals through power struggles and oppressive rule)
,
there were no conflicts motivated by a clash of opposing
The agreement was not favorably received in either
Brazil or Argentina; it was a direct cause for the fall of
Rivadavia in the latter, and increased dom Pedro I's
unpopularity in the former.
14
ideologies. Although Brazil was a monarchy surrounded by
republics, her system of government was not an issue in the
War of the Triple Alliance or in the wars over Uruguay.
Ideological conflict over religion was avoided by the
27Catholic homogeneity provided by the colonial power.
Economic systems of the time were too similar--or too
underdeveloped-- to provoke hostilities based on ideological
differences; Caspar Rodriguez Francia's (ruled 1814-1840)
totalitarian system in Paraguay, followed up in a less severe
2 8
manner by the two Lopezes, was not in itself the reason for
the war which destroyed it. Its success, which enabled
Francisco Solano L6pez to become a threat to his neighbors,
created the preconditions for the war, but the system was not
the root cause.
5 . Absence of Conflict Preventing or Controlling
Mechanisms and Institutions
Unlike Europe, which saw both formal and informal
organizations such as the Holy Alliance designed to prevent
war, no international mechanism existed in South America to
prevent, control, or mediate war. Various attempts at
creating such mechanisms were made, starting with the Treaty
of Perpetual Union, League and Confederation proposed by the
2 9Pan American Conference of 1826, ( ) which was never
27 The sertaneios' revolt m Brazil's Nordeste was
surely an ideological conflict, but nevertheless an internal
matter. The classic narration of this event is Euclides da
Cunha's Os Sertoes ( Rebellion in the
_
Backlands ), with a
novelized update by" Mario vargas Llosa iTi La guerra del fin
del mundo (The War of the End of the Worlfl—— - Madrid,
Editorial Seix Barrel,—1981) .
28 Carlos Antonio L6pez, "an obese man with a pig-like
face and a limp" (Fagg, page 583) , ruled from 1841 until his
death in 1862; he was then succeeded by the vice-president.
his son Francisco Solano, whose disastrous rule ended with
his death in battle in 1870.
2 9 Attended by Gran Colombia (now composed of Panama,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela) , Central America (now Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala).
Mexico, and Peru. The United States appointed delegates but
could not attend.
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ratified. The Congresses of Lima in 1848 (~^^) and 1865, (^')
32
and the Santiago Conference of 1856 ( ) similarly put forth
procedures to control conflict among states, but the treaties
they proposed were also never ratified. The principal means
of conflict prevention remained bilateral diplomacy and
third-party mediation.
Several European states (chiefly Great Britain)
, the
Church (after the Vatican eased its stance on the republics
in the 1830' s), and the United States exerted some degree of
influence on disputes during the period. In some cases (such
as the War of the Pacific and the War of the Triple
Alliance)
,
however, European capitalist interests actually
aided or stimulated one side to further their own gains.
Because of actual or perceived conflicts of interest—and
because they were in effect impossible to enforce--mediation
decisions were frequently disregarded by the side which saw
itself as the loser. Nevertheless, mediation provided a
convenient lull in disputes which at least provided a
breathing space for those involved.
The rubber boom of the late Nineteenth Century poses
an interesting case of successful conflict control. The
remoteness of the Amazonian jungle, with extremely hostile
terrain and tenuous boundary claims on all sides, helps to
explain the absence of armed conflict. Another mitigating
factor was the skill of Brazil's diplomatic negotiator Rio
Branco, who extracted concessions from almost all Brazil's
30 Attended by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru
.
31 In attendance were representatives from Argentina,
Bolivia. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Venezuela, and Peru. The meeting was held to discuss the
increased threat to the territorial integrity of the states
from Europe. Mexico and the United States could not attend
due to internal wars
.
Attended by Chile, Ecuador,_ and Peru. The
Continental Treaty of Alliance and Reciprocal Assistance was
signed; within three years, Peru and Ecuador went to war.
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neighbors. In addition, Brazil's geographic advantage,
with the Amazon providing access while the Andes hindered her
neighbors, contributed to peaceful resolution of the
situation; the other nations were simply unable to generate a
credible force vis a vis the Brazilians.
6 . War and Extracontinental Intervention
Largely through the intervention of Great Britain and
the continuing decline of Spanish and Portuguese power
projection capabilities, the former Iberian colonies were
spared any major reinvasion efforts. There were some
incidents (1864-1866) between the Spanish fleet and Ecuador,
Peru, Chile, and Argentina, including the bombardment of
Callao harbor and Valparaiso; however, the intent of the
Spanish expedition was punitive rather than invasive. Spain
did not recognize many of her former colonies until well into
-34
the second half of the nineteenth century.
The U.S. naval expedition to Paraguay and the British
and French blockades of Argentina and squabbles with several
regimes were symptomatic of the instability, disorganization,
and weakness of those governments. This style of gunboat
diplomacy, however, has not been forgotten; its implication
was that the state against which it is directed cannot be
taken seriously or is incapable of being with dealt with as
an equal
.
Although none of these incidents really meet the
criteria of a war, they were significant in their effect on
the Latin psyche vis-a-vis foreign intervention. They
colored Latin perceptions of the Monroe Doctrine and
Britain' s aid against Spanish and Portuguese recolonization;
these are often viewed as self-serving policies which enabled
33 Thereby enlarging Brazil by as much as 250,000 square
miles, according to Burns.
34 Spain recognized Mexico m 1836; relations with the
other states were gradually established throughout the course
of the century (Honduras was last in 1894) . See Burns, page
93.
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the Anglo-Saxon states to exploit South America, rather than
as altruistic moves to support Latin American independence.
European nations also intervened in some of the wars;
Britain's role in the struggle for independence was scarcely
concealed. Later, British ships ferried Uruguayans across
the Plata estuary in 1830 to declare a new state, independent
from Brazil. The British lent key logistics support to the
Triple Alliance against Paraguay. Peruvian tradition holds
that a French squadron prevented the bombardment of Lima by
Chilean naval units during the War of the Pacific.
A more insidious form of intervention was that of
arms sales and military training. The low technological
level in South America after independence precluded an
indigenous arms manufacturing capability for most of the
century; even after industrialization, it was still limited
to small arms at best. European and North American arms
merchants supplied various regimes and factions with
substantial equipment, including ships and field artillery.
European decisions to sell or not to sell could determine the
outcome of a possible war; Britain and Germany kept Chile
well supplied during the War of the Pacific, and the Triple
Alliance counted on British support.
By the end of the century, almost all the littoral
states had extensive foreign military and naval training
missions, from Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain or the
United States.
D. CONCLUSIONS
There does not seem to be any distinct correlation which
ties together all the wars in South America during the
Nineteenth Century, except that the aggressor initially
-3 c:
Peru's feckless President Mariano I. Prado (hero of
the 1866 war against Spain) went in mid-1879 to the United
States, where he initiated arms purchase arrangements.
Claiming that Chilean command of the sea precluded his return
and the shipment of the arms to Peru, he stayed abroad and
Peru did not get the weapons. Rumors persist that he
absconded with tne funds.
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believed he could win the war, and was going through a period
of economic growth. No uniform political, social or
economic factors can be found in the various wars.
Chile, aggressor and victor in the War of the Pacific,
had a heterogeneous population with a large proportion of
immigrants, was led by a civilian government and was
undergoing a period of prosperity and stability rather than
any internal economic or political turmoil. Lopez' dreams of
conquest were nurtured and enabled by one of the most tightly
controlled and ethnically homogeneous states in South
America; the larger neighbors would not have picked a quarrel
with him voluntarily, and did not do so with any of their
neighbors for the rest of the century despite internal
troubles of their own. Traditional antagonism between
Argentines and Brazilians based on cultural differences and
opposite conceptions of manifest destiny did not prevent the
two sides from banding together in wartime; yet Peru and
Chile went to war with each other only a decade after
fighting as allies against Spain in the mid-1860' s.
There was no such thing as a "typical" war which can be
used as a benchmark for judging the rest. The minor war
between Peru and Ecuador can be considered as the most
predictable, simply because of the constant aggravation
provided by boundary disputes. It contains all the elements
one would expect: traditional antagonism, military rulers
seeking popularity, a boundary dispute, preponderant force
and an easy victory for one side. Nevertheless, it is
essentially the only conflict of its kind after the turbulent
post-independence era. Similar differences existed among
numerous states in the area, but failed to erupt into full-
scale war. The same has held true to the present day; while
persistent disagreements constitute an irritant in relations
among states, they have produced only a very small number of
actual armed confrontations, and with very few exceptions
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these have been controlled before they escalated and war was
declared.
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III. FACTORS IN SOUTH AMERICAN REGIONAL CONFLICT, 1900-1967
A. THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: MILITARY PROFESSIONALIZATION
1 . Economic and Social Changes
South America experienced a great deal of change and
progress around the turn of the century as nations in the
region modernized and consolidated. This process, which was
reflected in military as well as socioeconomic institutions,
was largely related to the economic expansion of the
industrialized countries of Europe and North America, and was
largely guided and directed by extracontinental political and
economic forces and ideas. The principal role of the South
American nations in that expansion was not as equal partners
in development, however, but as suppliers of raw materials
and as markets for the finished goods manufactured by the
industrial nations.
The region also provided a safety valve for an
overcrowded Europe, and several South American countries
(chiefly the ABC nations—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile)
received an enormous flow of immigrants during the period.
Because of these economic and demographic ties, as well as
due to admiration and envy for European culture and wealth.
South America's governing elites aped the Europeans in
manners, mores, and style wherever they could.
This integration of Latin America into the world
economy necessitated a change in the structure and
orientation of society. The scale of the new national
economies required new skills, greater organization and
efficiency, and a sizable infrastructure. A new middle class
The South American nations for the most part lacked
the economic and technical infrastructure to match the
Europeans, although Brazil, Argentina, and Chile tried to do
so and succeeded to some extent.
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and a proletariat appeared, with unceasing demands on the
established elite for a greater share in power. New avenues
for social and economic advancement appeared, and rising
urban commercial wealth competed with and even replaced the
traditional upper class of landed aristocrats.
The philosophy of nationhood was also affected by the
demographic and economic changes. Nationalism emerged as a
potent political force, driven in no small part by
competition for resources to support growing populations and
37economies
.
Changes in the military reflected the changes in the
state; from being a motley group of factions owned by or
subservient to a particular popular leader ("caudillo") who
-D Q
offered them the spoils of power, the military gradually
became regularized along European lines, employing techniques
and organizational structures similar to those of European
armies. This was due principally to a conscious effort by
the various governments, military as well as civilian, to
bring about such a change as the states became more organized
and the era of the caudillos receded.
The identification of the military leadership with
the economic elite increased in this period. Motives for
military reform and reorganization varied from country to
country, ranging from nationalism and irredentism (Peru) , to
a desire for increased political stability (Venezuela) , to a
need for external security and safeguarding conquests
(Chile) . In most of the states, regardless of other
37 Burns (op. cit, p. 180) defines nationalism as " a
group consciousness tnat attributes great value to the
nation-state, to which total loyalty is pledged." This
general description can be applied to the early stages of
military nationalism during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries. The ethnocentric, anti-European and anti-North
American cultural nationalism which also developed at the
time, though it influenced politics superficially, was not a
manor factor among the South American military elite until
the 1930's.
38 Wesson, page x.
3 9 ...John J. Johnson, The Military and Soc iety in Latin
America (Stanford: Stanford University Pt^sS, 19647/ p. 62.
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missions, the military became synonymous with the maintenance
of order.
Politically ambitious military leaders recognized the
value of a more cohesive institution; because of historical
roles in forging the nation during the independence struggle
and defending national territory and honor in the wars of the
Nineteenth century, the armed forces were often looked upon
as embodying the nation and protecting national sovereignty,
becoming a powerful symbol and rallying point. This was
especially true given the weak, divided, corrupt and
ineffective political and bureaucratic structures of the
period, which often were unable to keep up with the demands
of the modernizing states. The military frequently
represented the only stable, disciplined, permanent
institution in the country; this identification with national
symbols, with order, and with efficiency gave the armed
forces of several countries some legitimacy as rulers in
their own right rather than as mere instruments of the state.
2 . European Military Missions
One of the principal methods for bringing about
modernization of the armed forces was the foreign military
40training mission. Table I shows the date of arrival and
nationality of the training missions in the various countries
which received them.
40 Varas (1985, page 3) that professionalization was to
a great extent a result of pressure by various rival
European imperial powers competing for control of the New
World following the decline of British imperial domination.
He then goes on to state, however, that in accepting the
missions the various South American armed forces acquired
higher prestige and some became "a national force, a true
expression ox society." It would thus appear that the
relationship with the Europeans was a form of symbiosis
rather than a unilateral imposition.
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Sources: Robert Wesson, The Latin American Military
Institution, 1986; Fifer, HoliV-i^,—1972 .
As can be seen, German influence predominated in
several countries. The Chilean armed forces' aptitude for
learning from their German instructors made them teachers in
their own right. The German influence is present to this
day, with many of the South American militaries still
marching in goose step and wearing German-style helmets.
Germany's military reputation was an important selling point;
Argentina briefly considered British training teams, but
decided on Germany due to Britain's poor performance in the
41Boer War.
The character of national grievance may also have
played a part in selecting the nationality of the training
mission; Peru had never given up hope of recovering the lost
territories of Tacna and Arica, referred to as the "Alsace-
Lorraine" of South America, and the Peruvians chose as
their advisors the army of a nation with similar irredentist-
4 3
revanchist views.
41 . .Wesson, p. 97. Nevertheless, a British naval
training mission was retained in 1902. Argentina's choice of
German instructors is of special interest since the Chilean
reorganization, which had been guided by the Germans, was one
of the main reasons that Argentina decided on military
reorganization of its own.
David P. Werlich, Peru: A Short History (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois Press, 1978), p. 169.
43 . .That the French also happened to be historical
antagonists of the country advising Chile (Germany) was
probably not coincidental. Another reason may have been
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The major physical consequences of military
reorganization, closely reflecting the greater efficiency of
the state, past wars, mutual antagonisms, and greater buying
power, included sudden and drastic increases in the size of
standing armies through national conscription, and the
buildup of large arsenals in an arms race that became
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continent-wide before long. The influx of European
instructors could have directed the army away from political
participation as was the case in Europe; this was not the
case. Chile's principal advisor, Lieutenant-Colonel (later
General) Korner, used his influence with the military to
provide critical support to a rebellion in 1891.
3 . The North American Influence
Even as European influence crested in the years
before the First world War, the United States began to exert
its strength in hemispheric affairs. While the U.S. in the
Nineteenth Century had generally been restricted to
commercial and political penetration on a scale similar to or
less than Great Britain, the "colossus of the north"
inexorably began to play a greater role in South America.
One of the first and most significant acts of the century was
the separation of Panama from Colombia, which made the latter
country implacably hostile to the U.S. for three decades and
worried many of the other nations about North American
intentions
.
The reception accorded to North American overtures by
the South American nations depended on both the country and
gratitude for the French role in preventing Chilean
ombardment of Lima in 1881.
Theresa Clair Smith's "Arms Race Instability and War"
(Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24 No. 2, June 1980; p.
2"5^")
—
provides—5—succinct—a^rrnition of an arms race: ''The
participation of two or more nation-states in apparently
competitive or interactive increases in quantity or quality
of war material and/or persons under arms.'*' For the purposes
of her analysis. Smith added that the duration of the race
was at least four years, and ended when the involved
countries declared war.
^^ Merrill, p. 196.
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the regime of the moment. Argentina generally perceived the
U.S. as a competitor for regional hegemony. Peruvian
President Augusto B. Leguia was an eager supporter of U.S.
interests; other Peruvian leaders proved less enthusiastic.
While the United States had supplied small arms to
South American nations since the mid-Nineteenth Century, it
was not until the Taft administration, around 1910, that the
4 fiU.S. began competing for naval sales in Latin America.
Taft apparently saw the sales as a good opportunity to aid
U.S. business. This policy came to fruition in 1914, when
Argentina--then engaged in a naval race with Brazil—received
47two battleships from the U.S.
During World War I Britain and France, and eventually
the U.S., exerted strong pressure on South America to turn
against Germany. By war's end in 1918, eight South American
countries had declared war on the Central Powers and four
others had broken relations with Germany (chiefly over anti-
shipping warfare policies) , distancing them from their
erstwhile mentors. The departure of the European missions
and the inability or unwillingness of the warring nations to
provide equipment and ordnance which they needed to fight
World War I created an opportunity for the U.S. to expand its
relations with Latin American militaries.
Although French and eventually German military
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missions to South America were renewed after the war, the
economic and political decline of the European powers
immediately after the war also increased the relative
strength of the U.S. in the hemisphere, with North American
influence and trade replacing or competing with European ties
in many countries. North American military missions arrived
4 f\ Wesson (p. 96.); the author notes that the Great
White Fleet had previously called at various South American ports .
At the same time, the U.S. provided advisors to
Brazil's Naval War College. Wesson, p. 97.
4 8 Brazil received a French mission in 1919; in the mid-
1930s, it was replaced by a German mission. Wesson, p. 90.
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in several countries for the first time shortly after the
49war.
B. CONFLICT IN SOUTH AMERICA 1900-1945
1 . The Postwar Situation
The South American republics experienced a
tremendous economic boom in some commodities during World War
I, as prices skyrocketed. Other sectors of the economy
collapsed, however, as some markets were cut off. This boom-
bust period was followed by an overall recession at the end
of the war, with a shattered Europe unable to sustain the
prewar economy. Soon thereafter, however, most of the
continent (though not Brazil) enjoyed a degree of economic
recovery as the Western economies "returned to normalcy, " a
development largely predicated on the growth of the North
American market. When that collapsed in 1929, South America
entered a period of severe economic depression accompanied by
political turmoil.
Once the world economy stabilized. South America in
the Twenties underwent a period of unprecedented economic
prosperity. Nevertheless, almost all the nations underwent
acute social and political crises brought on by the ever-
increasing demands of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie,
fueled by ideological revolutionary thought of both European
and local origin. In Chile, the military actually forced the
government to meet many popular demands and effect reforms
.
Brazil witnessed a number of anarchic, fascistic, and
communist movements, some with participation by military
elements. In Peru, despite an autocratic civilian
dictatorship, left-wing radical political thought and action
flourished. In all the countries, the groundwork was laid
for the major political changes that accompanied the economic
collapse of 1929.
4 9 The first U.S. mission to Peru arrived in 1922 to
advise the Navy. By the 1930s, North American officers were
deciding personnel and acquisition policies for the Peruvian
Navy. See Adrian J. English's Armed Forces of Latin America




2 . Economic Collapse, Political Upheaval
The Depression deeply affected every country in
South America; those which had seemed most stable were not
immune from the shock. The 11-year regime of Augusto B.
Leguia in Peru was overthrown within months; Argentina's
prosperity and civilian rule ended almost simultaneously;
Chile went through a brief period of anarchy; Brazil's First
Republic (1891-1930) collapsed economically and politically,
ushering in Getulio Vargas' fifteen-year rule. In almost
every nation on the continent, the military took a hand in
politics, whether to restore order or to bring about change.
The military men who took over in the wake of the
Depression were of a different cast from the Europeanists of
the turn of the century. They were predominantly drawn from
the middle and lower middle classes, and had a much more
developed group consciousness than their "caudillista"
predecessors. They also had an image of the military as the
embodiment of the national spirit and the protectors of
national sovereignty. For the most part, like the civilians
they replaced, they also lacked the ability to correct the
economic problems now facing their nations.
The nationalist ideal took on a new form under these
leaders, in many cases with a decidedly xenophobic tint.
Tolerance for the actions of neighboring republics and the
United States ran short, since the neighbors could be viewed
as competitors, and the United States (chiefly because of its
repeated interventions in the Caribbean and Central America)
was increasingly perceived as an exploitative nemesis which
had precipitated the dire situation in which the continent
now found itself.
This turbulent period witnessed the adoption of
geopolitical philosophy by the military intelligentsia of
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Elements of the political
systems of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy became role models
for a number of regimes as these nations seemed to vanquish
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their respective economic problems. The democratic ideal
was dispensed with in a time that seemed to call for
desperate measures.
3. Military Confrontations, 1900-1945
The development of armies organized along modern
lines, with the equipment and the logistics infrastructure to
employ them, coupled with competition for resources on a much
higher level than in the previous century, would seem to
presage an era of numerous wars and interstate military
adventures. Nevertheless, this was not the case until the
1930s.
a. Border Tensions
Boundary disputes, nationalist fervor and desire
for resources led to some faceoffs among states, but none of
these went much farther than skirmishes with few casualties
and no declarations of war. Many of them led to extensive
though not always productive diplomatic negotiation,
frequently with third-party mediation involved. For example,
Chile and Argentina engaged in considerable saber-rattling in
1902 in the midst of negotiations over Patagonia, but a
SIprompt British arbitral decision cooled passions.
In other cases, third parties sometimes provided
the catalyst for confrontation, as in the Acre dispute
between Bolivia and Brazil. Foreign interests moved into the
rubber-rich region at the turn of the century, with
concessions from both governments to operate in the disputed
territory. In 1903 Brazilian colonists in Acre rebelled, and
50 For example, Vargas set up a corporatist-paternalist
state; he tolerated the openly fascist Integraiistas for
several years, although he eventually purged them. Fagg
states (p. 9/2) that Vargas was "fascinated" by Hitler.
Argentina's Uriburu was and admirer of Mussolini, and
attempted to set up a corporate state in the Fascist
tradition. See James D. Rudolph, ed., Argentina: A Country
Study (Washington D.C.: American University PtSSS, 1986)
,
page 48.
51 A large statue, cast from old Spanish cannon and
representing Christ ("the Christ of the Andes") was erected
on the boundary line at Uspallata Pass in 1904 to commemorate
the agreement and as a token of eternal peace between the two
nations. Ireland, page 27.
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war seemed imminent. Brazil shut off the Amazon to Bolivian
traffic, and both countries sent troops. A contingent led by
the Bolivian president force marched through the jungle with
appalling losses to disease and climate only to be defeated
by the rebels.
In the end, Bolivia yielded 73,276 square miles
of territory through the Treaty of Petr6polis. U.S. and
European interests were paid off by Brazil, which continued
its political integration of the Amazon basin. Surprisingly,
subsequent to the loss of territory relations between the two
countries improved--further testimony to Brazilian
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negotiating skills.
Peru's long-simmering dispute with Chile over the
return of southern territories threatened to ignite on
several occasions into war, but negotiation and Chilean
military might prevented a clash. In 1910, President Leguia
(then in his first term) broke relations with Chile, and both
countries embarked on a costly arms race; while seemed on the
brink of war on several occasions, actual military
confrontation was avoided. United States arbitration finally
resolved the issue by the Treaty of Lima in 1929, but
S3
ultranationalists m Peru remained unsatisfied.
b. The Leticia Dispute
Peru was involved in a military clash just short
of war with another of its neighbors, Colombia. In his
second term, Leguia had maneuvered to settle a boundary
dispute with Colombia and thus isolate Ecuador, securing
Peru's northern flanks during the more critical negotiations
with Chile; the resulting treaty had ceded some territory to
Colombia, including access to the Amazon River. Realizing
S2
J. Valerie Fifer, Bolivia: Land, Location and
Politics
.
Since 1825 (Cambridq^l UnivetSltV—Press,—1972)
,
pages 128-130 . The Bolivian nighlanders suffered greatly in
the low altitudes and heat of the jungle; in addition, their
opponents wore green uniforms, whicn gave them a considerable
advantage over the Bolivians, who wore coarse white homespun.
^^ Werlich, page 169.
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the cession would be unpopular, the treaty's terms initially
were not revealed. In part due to resentment over the
treaty, Leguia was overthrown in 1930.
In August 1932, 300 armed Peruvian civilians,
apparently acting without the knowledge of the government,
seized the Amazon town of Leticia, ceded to Colombia in the
treaty and the focus of the dispute. President Sanchez
Cerro, the military officer who had deposed Leguia and was
subsequently elected president, initially disavowed the
action, but political circumstances soon made it inexpedient
to back down; returning the captured territory would place
his unpopular administration in jeopardy. Sanchez Cerro
rejected U.S. and Brazilian mediation offers, Peruvian
regular troops dislodged the civilians at Leticia but did not
return the occupied town to the Colombian authorities, and
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war seemed imminent.
The Peruvian position seemed strong enough; there
were 1,000 troops with artillery in the theater of
operations, a naval base at Iquitos with ships and a squadron
of seaplanes . Resupply through Peruvian territory was
difficult but possible. The Colombians, on the other hand,
had no military or naval forces in the theater, nor any
direct surface communications with the area. They mounted
an amphibious operation by ferrying 1,000 troops around to
the area via the mouth of the Amazon; this operation
necessitated Brazilian approval, which was granted.
Despite the difficulties of such a campaign and
the sizable initial Peruvian advantage, the Colombians
recaptured much of their lost territory in short order,
suffering only 30 losses against 800 Peruvian casualties!
Faced with this embarrassing result, Sanchez Cerro placed
Peru on a war footing, ordering a troop callup and
54 Werlich, page 199; Ireland, page 198
^^ English, page 168.
^^ English page 174.
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dispatching a cruiser and two submarines to the Caribbean;
however, while reviewing 25,000 new recruits on 30 April
1933, he was assassinated by a leftist youth. His
successor. General Benavides, had been selected as the
commander of Peruvian forces for the looming war; as
ambassador to London, however, he had met and was on good
personal terms with prominent Colombian politicians. He
began serious negotiations, and the situation was defused.
In the end, through Benavides' political acumen, the original
treaty was ratified by the Peruvian parliament.
The Leticia conflict is of interest because of
the nature of the players involved and the active
participation of a peacekeeping body, the League of Nations.
The withdrawal of Peruvians from Leticia, overseen by the
League, was the first instance of assumption of direct
control over territory by the League of Nations, and the
first actual operation by the League in the Western
5 8hemisphere. Although the League was unsuccessful in its
attempts to establish mediation and to keep the conflict from
escalating, it provided a suitable framework and forum for
termination of hostilities and conflict resolution.
The nature of the players cannot be overlooked;
had Sanchez Cerro remained in power, or been succeeded by an
equally demagogic leader, the outcome would almost certainly
have been war. Popular discontent over what amounted to
capitulation was ably deflected by Benavides, whose class
background, widespread respect as a national figure, and
moderate, conciliatory rule gave him a degree of stability
and legitimacy that the "upstart" mestizo populist demagogue
57 The assassination was linked to internal ideological
dissent, rather than to the Leticia affair.
5 8 Ireland, page 203. Both Colombia and Peru belonged
to the League. The League was officially notified of the
situation by Colombia on 2 January 1933; the League Council
then requested information from both parties and asked that
they refrain from using force. Subsequent League activity
was initiated by the League, rather than by the participants.
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Sanchez Cerro had never enjoyed. To his credit, Benavides
achieved peace without resorting to any internal scapegoats.
The original casus belli was dropped in the
government's lap by private individuals, motivated much more
by nationalism than by economic concerns. The principal
variables in the decision to continue the hostile actions
appear to have been Sanchez Cerro' s inability to accept the
possibility of loss of popular support (a function of both
his character and his self-perception of legitimacy) , and his
personal inclination to go to war (a function of his style of
rule and his radical nationalistic ideology). Benavides
kept Sanchez Cerro' s cabinet after assuming office; it
therefore seems that the ideologies of the two men and their
personalities (rather than any actual political imperatives)
were truly the major determinants.
Once again, the military or non-military
character of a nation's government proved of little relevance
in the decision to engage in hostilities. Colombia's
civilian government proved willing to go to war to defend a
thinly populated (less than 1,000 inhabitants), distant
c 1
territorial acquisition gained by a controversial treaty.
Thus the occupational-institutional background of the
governments does not appear to have been a factor in the
decision to engage in violence.
Economic well-being apparently was not a factor
either; neither country was in good financial shape, and
could ill afford to go to war. Winning or losing would have
5 9 Access to resources (patrimonio nacional) is a
component of nationalism in this type of incident, as much as
national pride. It would be hard nonetheless to make a case
for the Leticia incident as motivated by a desire to control
a resource other than territory itself (not exactly a scarce
commodity in the thinly populated jungle region)
.
fiO While there are some parallels here with the South
Atlantic War, there are also major dif ferences--chief among
them Sanchez Cerro' s intent to continue after suffering
major losses.
Although Colombia was admittedly the aggrieved party,
and this may have made the decision easier.
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little immediate impact on the economy. As a final note,
despite poor economic conditions, both sides retained the
enlarged militaries which they had built up during the
conflict; Peru, because of the perennial disputes with Chile
and Ecuador, and Colombia allegedly as a result of "an
opportune reassessment of the importance of the Colombian
armed forces."
c. The Chaco War
The two principal conflicts of the preceding
century left their mark on Bolivia and Paraguay; both nations
suffered major military defeats and territorial losses, and
their economic status since the wars had been precarious.
The two nations had been rivals over their borders since
colonial times; between 1879 and 1913, they negotiated
several treaties designed to fix a boundary in the region
known as the Chaco Boreal (Northern Chaco) but none of these
treaties was ratified by both countries. Paraguayan
settlers (chiefly Mennonites) had gradually moved into the
area, and a majority of the population considered itself tied
to Paraguay.
The original issues in the dispute involved
access to the Paraguay River; in the mid-Twenties, however,
oil exploration indicated that there might be deposits in the
area. Coupled with the opportunity to vindicate past
humiliations of territorial loss, this was a strong incentive
for both of the impoverished nations to assert claims to the
area. Both sides built forts across from each other and
expanded communications with the remote region.
The Argentine press widely reported that the
tension in the area was part of a power play between oil
companies (Royal Dutch/Shell vs. Standard Oil), which
English, page 169. Although Colombia also had an
ongoing dispute witn Venezuela over the Guajira Peninsula,
tensions at the time were not high enough to justify




Thomas E. Weil, et al, Paraguay: A Country Study
((The America shington u. u . 1972), page 144 .
fi4guaranteed arms credit for the potential contenders. The
United States did nothing to block arms shipments to Bolivia
via the Panama Canal, and when Peru requested State
Department advice regarding sending arms from Peruvian ports
to Bolivia, Washington declined to respond. Neither side
was serious about negotiations, which appeared to be delaying
tactics while positions were strengthened. League of Nations
involvement and mediation efforts by Argentina and Brazil
were ineffective. Several skirmishes took place along the
border beginning in 1928, and nationalist tensions gradually
rose to fever pitch. In the midst of negotiations for a
nonaggression pact, the Bolivians occupied a Paraguayan fort
in June 1932, and the war was on.
Despite the poverty of the belligerents and the
distances and terrain involved, the war was on a relatively
large scale. It caused great consternation among the other
countries of the continent, which continued desperate efforts
at mediation; nevertheless, war was declared in March 1933.
In a manifestation of its new attitude toward Latin America,
the Roosevelt administration officially announced that it
would embargo arms sales to the combatants
.
While remaining officially neutral, Argentina
backed Paraguay and Chile supported Bolivia. This was a
function of geopolitics of the "interior" for Argentina,
which was trying to obtain better leverage in one of the
buffer states with Brazil. Argentina's action triggered a
Chilean response, although Chile had previously been actively
involved in playing Bolivia off against Peru with carrot-and-
stick tactics. Partly for this reason, and because Peru
64 Fifer. page 210. In addition. Senator Huey P. Long
(D-La.) in 1934 and 1935 charged on the Senate floor that
Standard Oil was financing the Bolivian side of the war. The
company denied the charges. Ireland, page 90.
Ireland, page 81.
ft fi Chile's open support for Bolivia, including allowing
passage of arms through Arica, led to a rupture of relations
with Paraguay in 1934.
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traditionally supported Argentina as a counterweight to
Chile, now of potentially vital importance because of the
impending war with Colombia, which could leave a flank open--
Peru also backed Paraguay.
Military operations were a total disaster for
Bolivia, which at the beginning of the war had a much better
position on paper than Paraguay. Bolivian's German advisor
tried to use World War I trench warfare and direct offensive
tactics, and ignored to his misfortune the Paraguayan style
of guerrilla and maneuver warfare. Although Bolivia fielded
many more men than Paraguay, troops were seldom deployed in
sufficient numbers, and Bolivia's superior air power was
underemployed. The Bolivian troops, mostly from the high
sierra, suffered terribly in the unaccustomed heat and
humidity, in addition to having to march 400 miles from the
nearest railhead; there were as many casualties from disease
fi ft
as from the war's intense combat.
After a string of defeats, Bolivia accepted a
peace plan proposed by the League of Nations in December
1934; Paraguay had military momentum, however, and would not
negotiate. When the League requested an embargo against
Paraguay because of this intransigence, Paraguay announced it
was quitting the League. By May of 1935, the Paraguayan
offensive had stalled, but they had consolidated most of the
disputed territory. The next month, they agreed to peace
terms proposed by a six-nation commission made up of
representatives from the U.S., Argentina, Chile, Peru,
Uruguay, and Brazil. Paraguay kept the territory and Bolivia
was guaranteed access to the Paraguay River.
In the three years of declared war, total
estimated casualties were 250,000; Bolivia (pop. 3 million in
1930) suffered 55,000 killed and 83,0000 ill or wounded,
while Paraguay (pop. 836,000) had 45,000 killed and 67,000
^"^ Fifer, pages 212-214.
^^ Weil, et al, page 162
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ill or wounded. The Bolivian casualty rate (half of all the
personnel mobilized) left the eastern region of the country
virtually depopulated; the defeat was another humiliation
after the disastrous War of the Pacific, and added further to
Bolivia's economic and political morass. Paraguay doubled
its geographic size, but could ill afford the expenditure in
men or money.
The war ended when one side achieved its
principal military objectives and the other was too exhausted
to continue. The negotiation efforts by the League and the
American nations were of little consequence given the strong
nationalistic overtones of the drive to war in both
countries. While foreign mediation provided a forum for
discussion, neither side was willing to use it voluntarily as
a means of war termination. Foreign capitalist interests and
support from geopolitically-oriented neighbors may have
provided the means for the war to continue longer than it
might have, but nationalist sentiment was the principal
70factor behind this war.
Economic motives cannot be dismissed entirely;
the lure of oil wealth probably drove Bolivia to press its
claims. Nevertheless, these arguments were not voiced by the
countries involved until late in the war, suggesting that the
nationalist sentiment predominated over economic interest.
Militarism and armamentism very likely played a
hand in the decision to go to war. The Bolivians had what
seemed to be a vastly superior military, and may have
calculated on a short and successful campaign. They severely
underestimated enemy capabilities, and overrated their own.
Paraguay's initially deployed force consistently defeated
69 Ireland, page 95.
70 . .Bolivian President Salamanca's rationale for
declaring war was stated as follows: "It might be asked if
the Chaco is worth for Bolivia the pain of this sacrifice of
life... but surely there is in this problem more than a
balance of gains and losses; the very existence of Bolivia.
her full sovereignty, her dignity as a nation, her honor."
Quoted in Fifer, page 216.
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larger Bolivian contingents; once a certain number of troops
were committed and casualties incurred and inflicted, it was
politically and militarily difficult for the Bolivians to
scale down their effort.
The mediation efforts of the belligerents'
neighbors and the United States disguised a willingness to
provide arms conduits, especially through third-party
contracts. If the other nations in the region had adhered to
proclaimed principles of non-intervention and neutrality, the
war could not have lasted as long as it did, especially
between two landlocked countries. The League showed its
inability to enforce any of its tenets--including the
renunciation of force as a means to settle disputes, and the
non-recognition of territorial gains obtained by force of
arms .
d. Peru vs. Ecuador
The history of relations between Peru and
Ecuador is characterized by near continuous boundary
disputes. Twice in the 19th Century (1828 and 1859-60) the
two countries had gone to war. Although both nations had
submitted to arbitration, nothing was settled; in 1910, Peru
had mobilized 22,000 men against Ecuador while arbitration
was ongoing. Spain quit in frustration in 1910 after twenty-
three years of trying to settle the coastal and jungle border
issues; Leguia involved the United States in the Twenties, in
his endless maneuvering to secure his position vis-a-vis
71Chile. A treaty was signed in 1929, but was not
implemented
.
Peru delayed further discussion with Ecuador
until 1936, when other more pressing national concerns with
Chile, Colombia, and internal difficulties had been settled.
Peruvian negotiators in Washington showed little desire to
allow third-party mediation, especially since it appeared
71 Ecuador has historically sided with Chile, Peru's
primary antagonist, against Peru, its own main antagonist.
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that the U.S. negotiators were heading toward an "equitable
arrangement/" the Peruvians probably felt they could get
better terms from bilateral negotiation due to Peru's greater
72
strength.
The Peruvian military, and Peruvian national
pride, still rankled from the defeat in the Leticia incident.
The Peruvian military had remained at a substantial personnel
level, training had improved, and equipment had been
modernized. In 1940, Peru's president, Manuel Prado, enjoyed
popular and military support, and the economy was doing well.
Ecuador had an unpopular and unstable government, and a
small, poorly trained, ill-equipped, military. The outbreak
of World War II occupied the attention of the United States,
which was unlikely to intervene in Ecuador's favor.
In October of 1940, Peru began concentrating
troops along the border, including armored, naval, aircraft,
and airborne units. After a few border skirmishes, an
overwhelming Peruvian force crossed the border on 5 July
1941; by 31 July, effective Ecuadorian resistance had ceased,
the Peruvian forces occupied most of the key positions in the
disputed areas, and the undeclared war was over.
Washington viewed the conflict more seriously
than it ordinarily would have, especially after the Japanese
struck Pearl Harbor; U.S. policy was oriented toward
obtaining continental solidarity in the face of a common foe.
At the Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Rio
de Janeiro in January 1942, the U.S. and Brazil, along with
Argentina and Chile, pressed the two sides to come to an
agreement. On 31 January, the last day of the meeting, a
treaty was signed whereby Ecuador surrendered her claim to
7 380,000 square miles of territory.
72 Werlich (page 223) claims Peru even at this point was
already prepared to go to war if necessary. see also
Calvert, page 16.
^^ Werlich, page 224.
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The Ecuadorians felt they were obligated to
accept, not only by Washington's urging but because any
further resistance was unrealistic and could result in
renewed Peruvian advances. Within twenty years, Ecuador
disavowed the treaty as an illegal imposition and because of
(very) minor geographic omissions in the text. The issue
remains alive to this day.
Peru had unquestionably started the war; any
petty clashes could very probably have been controlled with a
minimum of effort, especially since arbitration was in
progress. Since Peru felt it had a stronger claim to the
area, which would have given it a better bargaining position,
its actions were indicative of a rather cynical intransigence
based on might instead of right. This was a realpolitik
approach, which flaunted most of the principles espoused by
the League and most of the other war-renunciation treaties
and organizations of the interwar period to which Peru
supposedly adhered. In Peru's defense, history had been
unkind to the nation, which had "lost" huge amounts of
territory through negotiation.
Surprisingly, after the war with Ecuador, the
Peruvian military's ties with the United States increased
dramatically, as Washington sought to counterbalance
Argentina and Chile's close ties to the Axis powers. The
Peruvian Army, which had doubled in size to 32,000 men during
the preparations for the conflict with Ecuador, remained at
that level. The U.S. shipped substantial quantities of arms
to Peru, and the U.S. military presence in the country
swelled. Peru provided basing rights to U.S. aircraft,
including anti-submarine warfare and combat reconnaissance
Peru had signed and adhered to the Gondra Treaty,
which enjoined it to avoid or prevent conflicts between
American states; the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war
as an instrument of national policy except in self-defense;
the 1929 Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration; the 1936
South American Anti-War Pact; and a number of bilateral pacts
which eschewed the use of war to settle disputes. See
Ireland, Chapter III.
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units. Pressing national security concerns therefore
overrode any earlier doctrine regarding aggression and arms
transfers to potential belligerents.
C. U.S. PRIMACY: 1938-1967
Franklin Roosevelt's presidency (1933-1945) officially
inaugurated the Good Neighbor Policy, a revised U.S. outlook
toward Latin America. It involved reduced interference in
domestic affairs, but at the same time did not withdraw the
military "helping hand" of advisory groups and arms sales.
When the Second World War broke out, this policy paid
political and military dividends, often in both directions.
Although the policy was gradually dismantled, the system
which it fostered under United States leadership had a
profound effect on hemispheric relations and conflict for
nearly three decades.
1 . The Good Neighbor Policy
Between 1898 and 1934, U.S. military intervention in
Latin America, especially in the Caribbean and Central
America, was a matter of course. The U.S. sent military
expeditions to, among others, Haiti (occupied 1915-1934) and
Nicaragua (occupied 1909-25 and 1926-33) . By the late
Twenties, this policy was already contested even within the
U.S. government. The Democratic administration which swept
into power in the United States after the 1932 elections
chose to follow a different course, known as the Good
Neighbor Policy, which eschewed intervention and
7 5interference.
75 The classic works on the genesis and decline of the
Good Neighbor Policy are the late "Bryce Wood' s The Making of
the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbi"! University
Press,—1961} . and—trs—?^uel, The Dismantling of the
_
Good
Neighbor Policy (Austin: University
—
Ut—Texas Press, 1985) .
Xn "both volumes. Wood pointed out that the Good Neighbor
Policy was a policy and not just rhetoric, "in that it was
principled action demonstrating in promise and behavior over
a period of time such evidence of continuity that assumptions
of stability may with confidence be based on it"
(Dismantling , page ix) . Wood defines intervention as sending
armed forces to a country without being requested to do so,
while interference means offering advice, exerting economic
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One of the new administration's first acts was to
attend the Montevideo Conference of the Pan American Union in
1933. The United States put forth a proposal for a
hemispheric peacekeeping mechanism, but it was blocked by
Argentina. The U.S. did, in a qualified manner, accept the
principle of nonintervention at the Conference by signing the
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.
In 1936, on the suggestion of President Roosevelt,
representatives of all twenty-one American republics met at
Buenos Aires. A declaration of inter-American solidarity and
cooperation stated four principles: 1) no acquisition of
territory by force; 2) intervention of one state in the
internal or external affairs of another "directly or
indirectly for whatever reason" was condemned; 3) compulsory
collection of pecuniary obligations was illegal; and 4) every
difference or dispute among American nations, no matter what
its nature or origin, would be solved by conciliation,
arbitration, or international justice. The non-intervention
convention was hailed by the Latin Americans as ending the
Monroe Doctrine; on the other hand, a collective security
convention was viewed by the U.S. as making the Monroe
Doctrine an inter-American (rather than a unilateral)
77 .policy. Despite the differences in outlook, this was the
beginning of a true inter-American regional system.
2 . The Second World War
The United States adhered faithfully to the
principles of the Good Neighbor Policy until security
pressure, or making shows of force to affect or influence
local political issues (page xi)
.
7 ft Craig H. Robinson, "Government and Politics" in
Rudolph, Argentina: A Country Study (Washington D.C.:
American Uni"Versity—Press, 1955) . Robinson states that
Argentina's views were that while the Caribbean and Central
America were within the U.S. sphere of influence. South
America should remain autonomous.
77 There was some disagreement over the issue of a
geace organization; Argentina and Mexico proposed including
uropean nations, to which the U.S., Colombia, and Brazil
were opposed. Material on the conference was drawn from
Ireland, pages 315-316.
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concerns over the deteriorating situation in Europe and Asia
forced a reassessment and reorientation. In the initial
phases of the war, Washington tried to remain within the
boundaries of the Policy in organizing support in Latin
America. Thus, a Foreign Ministers' Meeting of Consultation
was held in Panama in 1939 when war broke out, and in Havana
after France fell in 1940; the Panama meeting proclaimed
neutrality for the Americas and defined a neutrality zone,
while the Havana conference adopted the Declaration of
Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the
Americas. A series of military-to-military talks between the
7 8U.S. and several nations followed.
After Pearl Harbor, Washington made a major push for
continental solidarity, embodied in the Rio Conference of
7 91942 and its resolutions on collective security.
Not all the Latin American countries were as quick to
break their ties with the Axis as Washington hoped;
significant pressure had to be exerted for stubborn Argentina
to join in declaring war on Germany.
During the war, several of the South American nations
cooperated closely with the United States--none more so than
Brazil, which provided the only sizable contingent of Latin
American troops (the 25,000-man Brazilian Expeditionary
Force) to fight in Europe, as well as ample basing rights and
political support; in return, three-fourths of all U.S.
military aid to Latin America in the war period went to
Brazil. Other nations, including Colombia and Peru,
78 Wesson, page 98; Wesson also notes that
"satisfactory" bilateral agreements were reached with all
militaries except Argent ina '"^s .
7 9 The States gathered at Rio affirmed that aggression
against one was aggression against all, and the republics
"recommended to each other" that they break relations with
the Axis. Wood (1985), page 1.
80 Abraham F. Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1987T;^
—
p&g^ 124. L6W*hthal
notes that although Brazil's President Getulio Vargas had
played off Germany and the United States against eacn other
in the Thirties, he opted for reaffirmation of Brazil's
historic "special relationship" with the U.S. by 1940.
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provided basing rights and aided in patrol and local security
activities
.
In 1944, the United States called for an inter-
American Conference, held at Chapultepec Palace in Mexico,
which laid the groundwork for Latin American membership in a
future United Nations. It also envisioned another
supranational organization within the United Nations
82framework but on a regional as opposed to worldwide basis.
3 . The Organization of American States
The groundwork for hemispheric defense and conflict
control was laid down by the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (also known as TIAR or the Rio
Treaty) , which pledged that an attack against one nation was
an attack against all the others, and further obligated
signatories to submit the controversies among them to
procedures in force in the Inter-American System.
In 1948, the Bogota Conference set down the
guidelines for an "Organization of American States" (OAS)
,
whose security and political framework were set up in the Rio
Conference later that year. It was based on the following
"four pillars": non-intervention in domestic affairs of
members; equality under law for all states; settling of
hemispheric conflict through peaceful means if possible, but
through forceful collective measures if necessary; and common
83defense against external threats.
81 Wesson^ page 85. Mexico provided an air squadron
which fought in the Far East; Ecuador, Peru, and Colombia
granted use of air and naval bases (Fagg, page 1020) .
82 Wood, pages 80-85. Of note, the Chapultepec
agreement dropped the "directly or indirectly, for whatever
reason" from the clause on non-intervention. See Charles D.
Fenwick, International Law (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 19 65) , page 289.
8 "3 Brian Kelley, "The Inter-American System",
unpublished paper for NS3530 course at the Naval
PostGraduate School, Monterey, December 1987.
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One of its first successes was to stop Nicaraguan
Q A
intervention in Costa Rica in 1948. The OAS system
provided what the Truman administration saw as the only
legitimization of intervention: multi-lateral action by the
entire inter-American system.
After the war, the Truman administration largely
continued FDR's policy; in 1949, Secretary of State Acheson
reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention.
Nevertheless, with the rest of the world--and thereby
potential alternative markets for and influences on Latin
America--in a shambles, the relationship between the United
States and lands to the south necessarily took on a
different perspective. United States influence was
economically and politically predominant in Latin America
until the late 1950' s; this period is characterized as one of
American "hegemony" in the hemisphere.
In addition, there was no doubt that Latin America,
especially given the apparent spirit of cooperation which her
leaders manifested, was very low on the list of U.S. foreign
policy priorities (much to Latin America's chagrin, there was
no version of the Marshall Plan which looked south)
.
Washington's concerns were oriented far more toward Europe,
Asia, and the Middle East; North American economic and
military might in the hemisphere allowed if not enforced this
complacency. By and large, the region had no ability of its
own to project power or build up its worldwide importance
^^ Wood, page 133.
8 5 One area of politics where the Truman administration
may be said to have interfered was in its barely concealed
but understandable postwar dislike for dictators, and its
consequent preference for democratic regimes. This feature
was to prove an important factor in the demise of the Vargas
regime m Brazil, and the forcing from office of Venezuela's
Isaias Medina. John V. Lombardi, Venezuela (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p3^e 222. Burns,
page 230, misjudges Peruvian president Prado, including him
in the list of "''strongmen who were forced from office in
1945;" in fact, Prado presided over the fairest elections
Peru had seen since 1931, and voluntarily handed over power
to his elected successor. Burns also does a disservice to
Colombian president Lopez Pumarejo, who was forced from
office but hardly qualifies as a "srrongman .
"
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save as an adjunct or ally of U.S. foreign policy with its
increasingly East-West, ant i-communist orientation.
U.S. concern over the spread of communist influence
worldwide gradually expanded the idea of legitimate
intervention in Latin America to mean that "if a clearly
identifiable communist regime should establish itself in the
hemisphere, collective action with our leadership, would
ft 6probably be supported in Latin America." This single-
minded preoccupation with communism, not shared to the same
extent by other member nations, was to significantly weaken
OAS solidarity . ^"^
The Eisenhower administration changed the emphasis on
U.S. Latin American policy from non-intervention into one of
countering any glimmers of communist influence with whatever
methods were deemed necessary. In 1954, at the instigation
of the United States, the Tenth Inter-American Conference in
Caracas (1954) condemned international communism as a "threat
to the sovereignty... of Latin American states, endangering
the peace of America, and would call for appropriate
action "^^
Latin America underwent a demographic, political and
economic transformation during the Fifties, accompanied by a
growing self-awareness and a renewal of the Thirties' desire
for reduced dependence. Repeated U.S. intervention or
interference in Latin America, and highly visible U.S.
economic and cultural predominance of the time, made North
American leadership difficult to support or explain for many
of the OAS member states' regimes. In many cases, the OAS
provided hemispheric legitimation for U.S. actions, such as
intervention in Guatemala in 1954 and the Bay of Pigs
®^ Wood, page 144
87 Although several countries shared U.S. dislike of
communism. Colombia, for example, provided 3,000 combat
troops (a third of her army) to the United Nations Forces in





incident in 1961, but only in the face of broad popular
opposition. Cuba's defection was a severe blow to
solidarity, although subsequent Cuban actions momentarily
strengthened the OAS by giving it unity of purpose (the
Betancourt Doctrine of resisting foreign-instigated communist
subversion); however, U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic in 1965 erased any gains.
While the OAS provided a forum for multilateral
discussion of conflicts within the organization, it did not
entirely replace independent bilateral or multilateral
diplomacy for conflict resolution or deterrent purposes.
Argentina, for example, sought to establish a South Atlantic
Treaty Organization which included only Uruguay, Brazil and
Paraguay in 1957; the "Pacto Atlantico Sur" that emerged from
this effort concerned only training exercises, but Argentina
evidently had plans in mind for a multilateral defense of the
O Q
South Atlantic. As disenchantment with the OAS grew, this
type of negotiation and sub-regional alliance attempts
multiplied.
In summary, the OAS as initially conceived presented
a good opportunity for a hemispheric collective security
organization, which would defend against extracontinental
aggression, but would also focus on preventing
intrahemispheric conflict. Although it continues to
function, past North American dominance of the organization
and disregard for the established principles of the inter-
American system (which the United States had enunciated to
begin with) gradually rendered the OAS ineffective as a
hemispheric organization. Other major difficulties within
Q Q
Andrew Hurrell, "The Politics of South Atlantic
Security: A Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty
Organization." "Journal of International Affairs, Volume
59:2, Spring 1983. Page 181.
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the OAS are a ponderous bureaucratic edifice and confusion
over the organization's exact functions.
4 . The U.S. and the South American Military, 1945-1967
a. Ideology and Weapons Procurement
The postwar period in South America was
characterized by U.S. military predominance. European
missions were replaced almost in their entirety by U.S.
training and equipment, arranged on a bilateral basis (Mutual
Defense Agreements) rather than through a multilateral
organization such as the OAS. Large numbers of personnel
from South American armed forces received training at U.S.
bases in Panama and the United States under the International
91Military Education and Training (IMET) Program.
Part of the motive behind this was ideological;
sending military missions and training personnel in U.S.
facilities, it was hoped, "would have a democratic influence
on Latin American military attitudes." U.S. training
emphasized democratic values and military
"professionalization" , i.e. depoliticization, highly
specialized skills, and the acceptance of the legitimacy of
93civilian control of the military. To a significant degree,
90 . . .Aside from its security-oriented duties^ the OAS also
had functions ranging from treaties, maritime fishing rights,
and territorial integrity, to commercial aviation, taxation
of tourism, and music. In addition, frequent governmental
changes complicated the mission of the delegates, and further
clouded both the nature of their mission and their
accountability. Efforts at organizational reform were
largely unsuccessful, Kelley, pages 12-13.
91 IMET was a major program; for example, from 1950 to
1067, 4,279 Peruvian military personnel were trained under
the program, with U.S. $10. 6 million disbursed. U.S. Foreign
Military Assistance Programs (Washington D.C.: Government






93 Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal
Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Abraham Lowenthal
and Samuel J. Fitch, editors. Armies and Politics in LAtin
America (New York and London: Holmes 5 Meier, 1986)
,
page
138 . Tn Stepan' s typology, these values are defined as "old"
professionalism; "new" professionalism takes a much more
developmentalist and politically involved approach.
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economic and military aid were tied to democratic tendency as
94
well as to anti-communist orthodoxy.
The emphasis of United States military philosophy
toward Latin America changed substantially after 1945.
Whereas a major consideration of U.S. planners during the war
had been to employ South American allies in a conventional
military role against extracontinental threats, the new role
envisioned for South American armed forces after the war was
to control the spread of communism in the hemisphere. The
manner in which they were to do this was by acting as a
reserve force against external aggression. This was
generally reflected in U.S. training of Latin American
personnel
.
By the late 1950' s and early 1960's, the United
States awoke to the fact that anti-U.S. resentment in South
America throughout most social levels was running high.
Castro's takeover of Cuba was a rude blow to U.S.
complacency. In reaction, John F. Kennedy's policies
fostered the developmentalist outlook in order to win the
"hearts and minds" campaign against communist subversion,
while enhancing the image of the United States at the popular
level. The synthesis of his ideology was the Alliance for
Progress, which among other things shifted the MAP to
providing a heavy proportion of development-oriented
materials, such as road-building equipment, and weapons
suited for counterinsurgency rather than more traditional
95
military supplies.
b. The New Professionalism
The armed forces in at least two Latin American
nations, Brazil and Peru, had since the 1950' s established in
their philosophy the link among economic development, social




95 Augusto Varas, Militarization and the International
Arms Race in Latin Ameri"^a^ page 43.
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in order to successfully combat the spread of communist
subversion, or in any case of mass popular unrest, it was
necessary to alleviate to some extent critical social and
economic difficulties which were the root cause of the
problem.
This in turn became a "new" professionalism, with
the military deeply politicized, and seeking highly
interrelated military and political skills; the armed forces'
role expanded from conventional operations to participation
in and management of the political process, not in the name
of a caudillo, but in the service of national development.
The military's self-perception as the embodiment
of the nation and the defender of sovereignty had finally
found a peacetime cause. Their mission expanded beyond
merely preventing or combating external aggression, to
nation-building and to ensuring the internal security which
allowed it. This trend had significant political
repercussions. The military in most countries ceased to
regard themselves as enforcers for an elite which was
seemingly incapable of bringing about necessary changes in an
orderly fashion; as the need for accelerated development
seemed to grow, they saw instead that, as an institution,
they had more of the nation's interests in mind and a greater
capability to bring them to fruition than the civilian
sector
.
A major component of development was the
exploitation of resources which would help the nation along
its path, to include space resources for a growing population
as well as mineral, maritime and agricultural space^ The
defense or acquisition of these resources from external
competitors had long been viewed as a military mission. As
Stepan, page 192. David Wmterford summarizes the
new missions of the military in "Security, Sovereignty, and
Economics," Pacific Focus Vol II, No. 1, Spring 138T: 1)
symbolizing national 5T5Vereignty; 2) protecting external
security; 3) contributing to internal security; 4) and
engaging in "civic action and developmental activity."
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the military perceived the development crisis was growing
more acute, control over these resources became essential.
Protection of resources became a "geostrategic" requirement
in a competitive world. This led to tensions with
hemispheric and extracontinental agents as rivalries and
competing claims flared.
One of the very few military incidents of the
1950' s occurred over the resource issue, when in 1952
Argentine naval personnel allegedly fired at a British party
near the South Orkneys; both nations began moving naval units
toward the area, and relations deteriorated to the point
where the International Court of Justice refused British
requests to handle the case, since it appeared the two
parties did not share "a constructive attitude of mutual
97trust and cooperation." Although this could be viewed as
another sovereignty dispute, and it can also be attributed to
the militant nationalism of Juan Domingo Peron, it had
explicit resource-driven and strategic overtones.
c. Arms Purchases and the U.S.
One tenet of U.S. policy that remained steadfast
throughout this period was to avoid an arms race in the
region by preventing the introduction of high-performance or
advanced weapons systems. Since the United States had become
practically the only supplier of big-ticket items, and the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Military Assistance Program
(MAP) were limited to procurement of U. S . -manufactured
equipment, the South American nations had very little choice
in the matter.
Geoffrey Kemp provides a number of reasons why
advanced weapons such as supersonic aircraft had not been
introduced to mainland Latin America by the mid-sixties: 1)
the general effort of the U.S. legislative and Executive
97 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, "Antarctic Conflict and
International Cooperation, " in Antarctic Treaty System :_ An
Assessment (Washington D.C.: National Academy Fres"S,—1986)
,
page 5^. The Argentines subsequently claimed tney were
merely hailing the British vessel to see if all was well.
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branches to prevent it; 2) the inability or unwillingness of
the Soviet Union to do so; 4) the close-knit security ties
between the U.S. and its Latin American allies; 4) lack of
purchasing power by potential recipients; and 5) U.S. efforts
to redirect arms purchases toward naval (1947-1960) and
98
counterinsurgency (1950' s on) missions.
The U.S. perceived its arms policy as in effect
reducing the ability of the various South American arms
recipients to wage modern interstate war by depriving them of
the opportunity to purchase systems of sufficient quality and
in sufficient numbers to do so. In addition, it
theoretically provided the U.S. a discreet leverage on the
arms spending ceiling for individual countries, ensuring that
government expenditures focused on more productive
development-related activities,
d. Military Spending
The size, organization, and equipment of the
South American armed forces by the 1960's differed
dramatically relative to what they had been before the war.
This was a function of a different orientation of the armed
forces as well as broader economic and political change in
South America in the postwar era. In real terms, there was
an increase in military spending throughout the continent
(See Table II). Of note, increases in military strength show
very little relation to the type of government in power;
there appears to be closer relation to economic well-being,
99
and to perception of possible conflict or threat.
U.S. arms supplied at reduced prices (through the
Foreign Military Sales program) or as outright grants
98 Geoffrey Kemp, "The Prospects for Arms Control in
LAtin America,"^ in Philippe C. Schmitter, editor. Military
Rule in Latin America (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
19 7 3) , pa^e 205-206.
99 For example, Brazil's period of greatest military
growth after the war was during the civilian government or
Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61); Joao Goulart (1961-64), who
was deposed by the military, projected major pay increases
for the armed forces
.
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(through the Military Assistance Program) also helped to keep
arms expenditures at a relatively low level. A significant
amount of World War II surplus equipment was sold or
transferred to South America as military assistance. By the
late 1950' s, almost all of the South American nations'
arsenals included substantial quantities of U. S . -supplied
materiel, greatly increasing the size of arsenals, but firmly
establishing a near-total dependency on the United States as
the source for weapons
.
Notwithstanding the increases in equipment, the
chief pressures for increased military spending were due to
personnel and organizational requirements, rather than to
armaments purchases; as an example, manpower strength of
South American armed forces expanded from 220,000 in 1940 to
540,000 in 1968. -"-^^ Gertrude Heare notes that such
modernizations to the military structure as training schools,
retirement programs, permanent cadres, housing and health
101facilities, etc., vastly increased spending. Personnel
costs frequently received priority over appropriations costs.
Sudden surges in funding were more likely
attributable to governments compensating for programs which
had been deferred due to austerity measures, than simply to
rearming or extensive acquisitions. This helps in part to
explain the apparent surge in military spending by military
strongmen such as Rojas Pinilla, Peron, Ibahez, and Perez
Jimenez as infrastructure repairs and improvements rather
Gertrude E. Heare, Trends in Latin American Military
Expenditures, 1940-1970 (Washington t U.S. Government printing
Ofrice /Department: ot State, 1971). page 7. Demographics
almost certainly had a great deal to do with this increase,
since the population of^ South America grew at a high rate
during this period. In I960, Latin America had less than 200
million inhabitants; by 1970, there were close to 300





The expense of setting up separate air forces after
1940, with all the organizational infrastructure and new
equipment they involved, was substantial.
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than simply inventory modernization and massive arms
102purchases
.
In relative terms, however, military spending did
not increase substantially; it received essentially the same
"piece of the pie" as it had in the past, except now the pie
was bigger (See Tables II and III) . The South American
economies were experiencing growth at the time; despite the
substantial real growth of military expenditures in the major
South American countries, they varied little as percentages
of the GNP or of fiscal outlays during this period.
Expenditures during the period are shown on the following
table
.
1 02 Heare, pages 7 and 8
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TABLE II
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AS PERCENT OF GDP. FISCAL SECTOR
EXPENDITURES (FSE), AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME) ON A




































As the table shows, the percentage of fiscal
expenditures fluctuated to some extent (note Argentina's
1945 figures) , but generally stayed within a relatively
narrow range, especially relative to the GDP. The overall
trend of the percentage relationship over the years was
downward for all nations, except Brazil after 1965 and Peru
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after 1967. Real military growth in Latin America was
substantial in comparison with the past, but military
spending remained at a moderate level
.































^^^ Heare, page 2
55
D. CONCLUSIONS
South American military establishments became relatively
professionalized armed forces during the twentieth century,
along the same lines and with the assistance of their
counterparts in Europe and North America. The incidence of
interstate war in the region continued at a relatively low
level, and was once again, as in the previous century,
characterized by initial aggression on the part of a state
that considered itself better armed than its opponent, and
hoped for a quick and sweeping victory.
In two of three cases studied (Chaco War and Leticia)
,
internal factors either caused escalation or prevented de-
escalation; in both cases, however, international
organizations (the League and hemispheric multilateral
groups) provided a framework for war termination, conflict
resolution, and conciliation. In a third, an aggressor's
conquests were recognized by international bodies which had
specifically condemned aggression and renounced conquest as a
means of territorial acquisition.
The United States established a policy which from the
1930' s on did not truly reflect its status as the dominant
military, economic, and political power in the hemisphere;
instead, it chose a polite fiction of equality. However
unrealistic this policy may have seemed, it allowed the U.S.
to establish an unprecedented if temporary rapport with its
hemispheric neighbors, and in somewhat modified form allowed
for the building of an inter-American system that minimized
outbreaks of conflict in South America for twenty years.
One key consideration is that it was not so much the OAS
itself, as the arms policy and political-economic dominance
of the U.S. that kept the peace. This ended when U.S. policy
in the area failed to change to meet the needs of the
situation, either through misperception, unwillingness or
inability. In South American eyes, U.S. policy became too
56
obtrusive, and clashed with or drifted away from the




IV. SOUTH AMERICA SINCE 1967: CONFLICT AND TENSION
The United States' policy of preventing the acquisition
and spread of modern high-performance weapon systems appeared
to have been accepted and formalized by the Latin American
nations when they met at the 1967 Punta del Este (Uruguay)
Hemispheric Summit Conference, and resolved not to purchase
more weapons than each country needed for its own defense.
That same year, Peru finalized the purchase of a squadron of
Mirage supersonic jets from France, marking the first step in
the effective end of the virtual U.S. monopoly on arms sales
to the continent.
The increased modernization of the South American
arsenals, which provided the newly armed nations with a
potential capacity to wage war on a greater scale than ever
before, was matched by a concurrent heightening in interstate
tensions. The United States no longer exercised the same
degree of influence or control over South American foreign
relations which had allowed the perception of a "Pax
Americana, " and other international organizations and systems
seemed unable to ease tensions. The situation reached its
nadir in the late 1970' s and early 1980' s, when it appeared
that armed conflict on a major scale among continental actors
was not only possible but probable. When war did occur,
however, its scope, direction, and motivation were unexpected
and very probably unplanned even by the participants.
This chapter will address the 1967-1983 "arms race" in
South America and seek to examine the reasons for the upsurge
in tensions during that period; it will also examine
prospects for potential conflicts among states based on
developments since that time and long-term historical trends
on the continent.
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A. THE ARMS RACE SINCE 1967
1 . Peru: A Case Study for the Arms Race
Peru presents an interesting case study of South
American armamentism. Peru's acquisition of Mirage fighter-
bombers in 1967 was a watershed event for two reasons: it was
the first time that a South American nation purchased
supersonic aircraft, and it was also the first time since the
Second World War that a South American nation had made a
major arms purchase against strong U.S. opposition. It
therefore introduced a new and more advanced type of weaponry
into the region, and indicated that the end was near for
North American suzerainty in the arms market.
Peru had initially tried to purchase high-performance
aircraft from the United States. The Belaunde government
(1963-1968) requested the U.S. to allow the sale of F-5
aircraft (which was designed for export and the U.S. was
supplying on a grant basis to Ethiopia) ; the Peruvians were
1 04turned down. The Belaunde government admittedly presented
its case somewhat unconvincingly; the Peruvian President told
the New York Times in an interview that the Peruvian
military's desire to have the aircraft was "silly, but
lOS
understandably human." Despite the banana republic
overtones, the aircraft purchase and especially the U.S.
refusal to supply them had become a major domestic political
issue in Peru.
Part of the reason the U.S. forbade the sale was
because Washington felt that Peru's financial situation would
not allow it; the Peruvians purchased new aircraft
regardless, and ended up paying a higher cost at a higher
interest rate for less aircraft than they wanted, from a
supplier who could not provide the same level or quality of
support as the U.S., and whose equipment was not easily
Luigi Einaudi, "U.S. Relations with the Peruvian
Military", in Daniel A. Sharp, Ed., U.S. JForeign Policy and




"^^ New York Times
,
3 August 1967, 8:2.
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integrated with the predominantly U.S. -made Peruvian
inventory.
For its part, the U.S. lost an opportunity to make a
sale, and was unable to prevent the introduction of high-
performance aircraft into the region anyway. The only gain
was perhaps the moral satisfaction of not catering to the
whims of a minor ally and thereby sanctifying a potentially
widespread demand for upgraded aircraft and other military
inventories. By removing itself from the process, the U.S.
also lost a great deal of leverage, opened the advanced
weapons market to foreign competition, showed itself as an
unreliable arms supplier, and suffered some loss of face and
goodwill.^*^^
The Peruvians made another request that year for an
aircraft purchase which involved U.S. approval: Britain was
selling off some obsolescent Canberra medium bombers which
had U.S. engines. This request was also blocked for
financial reasons (Peru was running a $100 million deficit)
,
and was accompanied with a threat to cut off aid to Peru due
to an amendment to the FY1968 Bill, which required the U.S.
to reduce economic aid by an amount equal to the funds spent
107by a developing nation on advanced weapons.
The veto and the aid cutoff threat generated a furor
in Peru. They were seen as political-economic paternalism;
10 6 The market for less sophisticated weapons had long
been open to non-U. S. suppliers, although frequently with
U.S. tacit or outright approval. Great Britain supplied 86.5
gercent of the 23/ aircraft transferred to South America
etween 1945 and 1955; of the 465 units transferred from 1955
to 1965, the U.S. share increased to 53.4 percent, the U.K.'s
declined to 17.7 percent, and France provided 18.6 percent as
a new competitor. The U.S. held greater sway over naval
transfers, supplying 49 of the 74 warships transferred
between 1945 and 1965. Varas, page 39. It should be pointed
out that many of the aircraft of which the French and British
divested themselves were of U.S. origin.
^^'^
"U.S. Halts Aid to Peru over Aircraft Deal," New
York Times , 17 May 1968, page 1. Other amendments which
Interrered with arms sales were the 1962 Hickenlooper
amendment, which cut off aid to countries that expropriated
U.S. -owned property without adequate compensation, and the
1968 Pelly amendment, which restricted aid to countries that
enforced the 200-mile territorial water limit.
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since the Peruvian Congress had recently passed a bill which
threatened expropriation of a Standard Oil subsidiary, it was
also seen as pressure over sovereignty and control of a
national resource.
The Peruvian purchase set an example which was
quickly followed elsewhere on the continent. Argentina
purchased AMX tanks, also from France, after experiencing
similar difficulties when it tried to obtain modern tanks
from the U.S. Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela also purchased
advanced weapons from non-U. S. sources. U.S. military sales
to the region diminished either by donor or recipient action,
while purchases from other sources skyrocketed, as can be
seen from the following table.
TABLE III
ARMS IMPORTS BY SUPPLIER
1964-1983















1974-78 90 650 180
1979-83 50 440 610
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (ACDA
YearbookgT
Note: 1964-73 figures in 1973 U.S.$; 1974-78 in 1979 U.S.$;
1979-1983 in 1984 U.S.$.
The arms purchase trend took on a more serious aspect
when considered within the context of the breakdown of the
U. S . -sponsored inter-American conflict resolution system.
The states which were arming themselves were in many cases
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those which had long-standing quarrels with neighbors
(Argentina, Chile, Peru) , at a time when the credibility of
the principal hemispheric peacekeeping organization, the OAS,
was in doubt due to U.S. unilateral actions and its
consequent unpopularity in much of Latin America.
In addition, a new ideological bent had been added to
the conflict equation; a series of political turnovers in the
late 1960's and early 1970' s temporarily placed radical left-
wing governments in power in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and
Bolivia, while the Peronists returned to power in Argentina.
These regimes were characterized by nationalism, instability
and unpredictability, as well as by unsuccessful or simply
catastrophic economic policies. The U.S. was less willing to
provide arms to leftist nations whose policies and interests
10 8
were frequently inimical to its own.
It was not the leftists, but the extreme-right
governments which followed in their wake that heightened
tensions in the region, and may have increased the pace of
109interstate-conflict oriented armaments acquisition. One
of the largest purchases of this type was made by the
Peruvian government in 1974, when the leftist military junta
acquired several hundred tanks from the Soviet Union--very
probably because of a perception that because of the extreme-
rightist takeover in Chile it now faced a less friendly
neighbor to the south. This was the first major purchase
of Soviet weapons by a South American nation.
10 8 For example, the U.S. had a number of disputes with
Peru and Ecuador over the economic-strategic 200 nautical
mile maritime boundary. U.S. legislation restricted aid to
countries that enforced the limit "by arresting or fining U.S.
fishermen. Other U.S. legislation punished nations which
expropriated U.S. citizens' property without adequate
compensation
.
109 . .Peruvian relations with traditional antagonists
Chile and Ecuador were remarkably cordial during the 1970-
1973 period for the former and 1972-1975 timeframe for the
latter.
Chile's president Salvador Allende was overthrown in
September 1973 by a far-rightist junta led by Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte, allegedly backed by the U.S.
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The Soviets had not sold weapons to the Chilean
military during Socialist President Allende's term, probably
to avoid antagonizing the right-wing military by highlighting
the extent of Soviet support for the regime. An eventual
Allende triumph which would turn Chile into a bona fide
communist nation would vindicate the Soviets' "gradual
revolution" outlook; Soviet moves which might precipitate a
military coup were therefore avoided. The constraint was
removed when Allende was overthrown; aid to a left-wing
government in Peru might help to balance what the Soviets
considered "a reactionary counteroffensive unprecedented in
Latin American history... that was swallowing up one country
111
after another."
Peru followed up the purchase of Soviet tanks with
the acquisition of two squadrons of Soviet Sukhoi Su-22
Fitter swing-wing fighter bombers in 1976, after the U.S.
112
once again refused to sell Peru F-5's. The Peruvian
economy was in a shambles, but the Soviets offered excellent
terms; it is unlikely that any European country could or
would have matched the offer. In spite of this largess, no
11'}
other South American nation purchased Soviet weapons.
Once the link was established, however, Peru continued to buy
Soviet weapons; the army's ground and air inventory is
heavily Sovietized, and the air force operates Soviet
transports in addition to the fighter-bombers.
In spite of this heavy arms traffic, and perhaps in
spite of Soviet hopes, the relationship between Peru and the
111 . . ...Robert S. Leiken, Soviet Strategy m Latin America
(New York: Praeger, 1982), pag6 28.
112 The United States did not cross the threshold of
selling supersonic aircraft in Latin America until the Reagan
administration sold F-16 fighters to Venezuela in 1981.
Andrew J. Pierre, The. Glopal Politics, _ of Arms ^Sales
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pages 66-67
.
113 . . .Personal contacts m Peru indicate some
dissatisfaction with Soviet equipment^ especially over spare
parts availability, excessive political indoctrination of
operator trainees, and maintainability. One source claimed
that most of the Su-22' s are grounded, with all priority
going to counterinsurgency aircraft.
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East Bloc remained principally commercial and did not
progress politically or ideologically. Peru also continued
to buy arms from other sources. The U.S. resumed arms sales
to Peru in 1974 after a settlement of expropriation
compensation, although the arms provided generally reflected
the earlier counterinsurgency emphasis. European arms sales
continued, especially to the Peruvian navy, which to date has
not purchased Soviet equipment.
By 1977, Peru's military expenditures were being
driven by the impending centennial of the War of the Pacific;
revanchist popular sentiment in the country was running high.
Although the government was internally unstable, and the
economy was in ruins despite a major reorganization, arms
purchases continued even when tensions with Chile cooled.
The buying spree went on as the economy almost collapsed just
before a transition to civilian power; only three months
before the transfer, the junta bought an additional two
squadrons of Su-22's.
2 . Economic Dimensions of the Military Buildup
Table IV illustrates regional military expenditure
trends during this period.
114 Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Polxtics of Arms Sales





MILITARY EXPENDITURES (ME) AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP AND



















































































Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
,
1981 and 1986 Yearbooks. Note that Peru''^s ME figure
reflects pensions, while Chile's does not. Brazil's low
level of expenditure probably reflects government ownership
of military production facilities.
The chart indicates that real military spending had
increased substantially in the years under evaluation, as had
GDP; but the relative spending showed little if any increase
since the pre-"arms race" days in the countries studied. The
greatest jumps occurred, predictably, in Argentina during
tensions with Chile and during the Falklands/Malvinas War; in
Chile during tensions with Peru and Argentina; and in Peru
during tensions with Chile and during the recrudescence of
the internal war with Sendero Luminoso after 1980.
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Another way to gauge whether or not the South
American arms race was a dangerous anomaly or a historical
trend is to compare the threat level perceived by the various
countries on the continent. This is based on the rationale
that a country would increase or upgrade its inventory in
response to a perceived increase in requirements for
national defense. It appears that the race did not originate
from heightened threat perception, but it eventually raised
tensions to the point that it became a self-fulfilling
prophecy
.
In this context, going back to the early stages of
the race, there is little indication that 1966-67 represented
a period of heightened tension between Peru and either of its
traditional antagonists, Chile and Ecuador. Therefore, the
"race", at least in its initial period, was most likely due
to the historical trends and an effort to modernize in
accordance with the leadership's view of the country's
status, rather than due to any fears of impending attack.
Coupled with a changing international and domestic political
situation in the region by the 1970' s, this self-indulgence
generated enough concern among neighbors to set off a costly
multilateral race which eventually had aggressive or hostile
overtones
.
3 . Indigenous Arms Production Capabilities
In addition to purchases from overseas suppliers,
Argentina and Brazil have established large-scale arms
industries of their own. While these industries are
technologically far behind those in more developed countries
and currently do not have the capability to meet even all the
military requirements of their own nations, they represent a
significant step toward reducing dependence on outside
suppliers, integration of equipment, development of new
technologies, cost reduction, enhancement of national self-
esteem and prestige, and great potential for export earnings.
Brazil's industry is larger than Argentina's, and has
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been more successful in the export market. The Brazilian
defense industry was conceived, started, and encouraged as a
conscious policy decision by the authoritarian regime which
took over in 1964. It went through three phases of
development (initial planning and technology acquisition,
with low-level manufacture; development and coproduction with
increasing sophistication; high technology military-
industrial complex). The decision to produce weapons no
doubt received an added boost when the Carter administration
reduced aid to Brazil due to charges of human rights
violations, thereby overturning the "special relationship"
which had been building for a century.
The Brazilians have made effective use of offset
arrangements and licensing for technology transfer to build
up their base. In addition to vehicles, small arms, and other
low- to medium-technology systems, Brazilian concerns produce
indigenous or licensed surface-to-surface, surface-to-air and
air-to-air missiles, subsonic transport, trainer, and combat
aircraft, submarine and surface ship coproduction, and are




Brazilian arms exports reached a high of $500 million
in 1984, up from $60 million in 1975. Customers included
several Arab countries, but also Peru and Argentina. Brazil
has become the world's largest exporter of light armored
vehicles. According to Jane' s Defence Weekly , the Brazilian
115 Clovis Brigagao, "The Brazilian Arms Industry,"
Journal of International Affairs Vol 40, No. 1, Summer, 1986.
pages 106-11.
116 Anne Naylor Schwarz, "Arms Transfers and the
Development of Second-Level Arms Industries" in David D.
Louscher and Michael D. Salomone, Editors, Marketing Security
Assistance (Lexington, Mass. and Toronto: Liexingnon books,
1987;
,
page 118. One of the systems the Brazilians are
currently developing indigenously is a high-accuracy truck-
launched 300-km range missile, the SS-30t). Its accuracy
reportedly will "preclude the use of a nuclear warhead." See
"Brazil's Growing Missile Industry," Jane's Defence Weekly
,
Volume 9 No. 9, 5 March 1988, page 401:
'-''^ ACDA Yearbook , 1986, page 109. In constant 1983
dollars, the figures are $104 mil lion and $4 8 3 mil lion respectively .
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Osorio tank is under serious consideration by the Saudi army
118
as its new main battle tank. The arms industry remains an
economic and not a foreign policy asset vis-a-vis Latin
America at the moment; although half of Brazil's military
attaches are in South America, Brazil's weapons clout will
probably be exercised with large-order cash customers such as
Mideast nations.
Argentina's industry is on a smaller scale, and tends
to be on a slightly less sophisticated technological level,
but includes helicopters, counterinsurgency aircraft and
surface-to-surface missiles as well as small arms, submarine
coproduction (currently stalled), surface ships, and armored
119fighting vehicles. Like Brazil's arms industry, it
received strong motivation from the 1977 cutoff of U.S. aid
120for human rights violations. The South Atlantic War also
provided an object lesson in the perils of dependency on
foreign sources, as well as the need to modernize.
Argentine arms exports have been sporadic (Argentine
exports peaked at $80 million in 1984, but most of that
consisted of repayment in kind for Falklands War loans to
Peru and Venezuela, and selling off of existing armament)
,
and Argentina's general economic malaise has severely
121
affected the arms industry.
The indigenous arms industries can be two-edged
swords; despite the benefits listed above, they also can
become a very expensive liability; their ties to national
sovereignty and necessarily to the military constituency
makes it difficult to close them down if they do not produce
efficiently or are unable to find a market for goods. In
^^°




Volume 9 No. 5, 6 February 1988, page 191
119 Tracy E. deCourcy, "Countertrade and the Arms Trade
in the 1980' s," in Louscher & Salomone, pages 167-168.
^^^ Pierre, page 243.
121 .ACDA Arms Transfers and Military Expenditures
Yearbook 1986, pags 110.
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addition, the need to sustain the arms industry can lead to
unsavory associations, such as Brazil's arms sales to Iraq
and reputedly to Libya, which could compromise relations with
1 22
other states and in themselves be a source of conflict.
A great question in indigenous arms production
remains the inclination to develop and build a nuclear
weapon. Both Brazil and Argentina are assessed as
technically capable of developing their own crude weapons;
both theoretically have access to plutonium or enriched
uranium, although Brazil far less so than Argentina.
Nevertheless, Argentina's nuclear program is no longer under
military direction, and although it has refused to sign the
Tlatelolco Treaty and other non-proliferation pacts,
Argentina has expressed an intention not to develop a nuclear
123weapon . -^^-^
The greater question is therefore why they would
build such a weapon, and in what scenario they would consider
its employment. The best rationale for either to build a
bomb would be that the other had built one first; both
nations agreed in late 1985 to preliminary measures for
mutual inspection of facilities. While this is probably
cosmetic at the moment, and though Brazil no doubt fears
Argentine instability, measures of this sort provide a basis
124for eventual expansion of mutual security arrangements.
There is little incentive for Argentina to use
nuclear weapons against Great Britain, a nuclear power in its
own right which has demonstrated willingness to use violence.
Nor is there any major continental foe on the horizon against
which Argentina would be likely to employ nuclear force or
even coercion, especially with Brazil as a foil.
122 Ricardo Azumbuja Ant, "Menos Averigua Brasil, y
Vende Armas," Institute Peruano de Polemologia, Volume 2 No.
2, July-Septemb6t 1987, page 11.
^^^ Wynia, page 190.
J. Selcher, "Brazil's Relations with Latin America,"
Journalof Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , Volume 2 8
Number 2, Sufniner 1986, page 96.
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4 . The Military Buildup Assessed
While the military buildup and the arms race have
drawn enormous publicity as a possible prelude to or symptom
of conflict, and as a disastrous self-indulgence for nations
on the brink of bankruptcy, it could just as easily be
explained for the countries on table III as within the bounds
of historical armed forces spending levels. Latin American
arms purchases and manning levels on both a relative and a
real scale, are generally lower than those of almost any
other region of the world, even including Africa (Oceania
125does spend less)
.
On the other hand, the large-scale arms purchases of
relatively sophisticated (in comparison to neighbors) weapons
systems generate a momentum of their own due to the tensions
they create. Neighboring states perceive arms purchases not
as routine modernization, but as an upgraded threat,
especially if there are any unresolved issues between the two
states
.
At the current time, it appears that the high-
technology, big-ticket item arms race, at least for Peru and
Argentina, two of the key participants, is well nigh over.
Both Peruvian President Garcia and Argentine President
Alfonsin have drastically cut military purchases and
budgets. While economic problems in the two countries are
127. . . .
certainly part of the reason, disenchantment with military
-•^^ ACDA Yearbook 1986
,
pages 11 and 36.
1 2 fi Peru's Garcia cut the purchase of the Mirage 2000
from 24 aircraft to twelve; Argentina's Alfonsin has
considered putting several naval ships on the auction block,
reduced the purchase/coproduction agreement of German
.p that "he doesn't have the money" to pay
existing military debts with suppliers, and Alfonsin himself
told the military chiefs of staff that he would back their
modernization efforts "once the military had purged certain
elements in its ranks." See "Alfonsin Looks to Safeguard
Argentina's Democracy," Jane's Defence Weekly , Volume 9
Number 7, 20 February 1988, pige 301.
12 7 In Argentina, for example, 1,000 percent inflation,
capital flight, and a $50-billion foreign debt, with per
capita income less than it had been fifteen years earlier,
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solutions to international disagreements is also an avowed
cause of their respective political platforms. Chile, on the
other hand, apparently intends to continue purchasing
12 8
arms. Of importance in assessing the arms race is
whether or not the nations which purchase the sophisticated
weapons are capable of using them effectively; Libya, for
example, had a huge inventory of combat aircraft but after a
single engagement in 1981 the Libyan Arab Air Force did not
confront U.S. combat aircraft with hostile intent again--
including in the 1986 confrontation, when U.S. aircraft met
with no airborne opposition during strikes against Libya.
Could the same be said for the South American arsenals?
In Argentina's case, at least, the answer is
undoubtedly no. The Argentines managed to employ many of
their advanced weapons (high-performance jets, surface-to-
surface missiles) effectively. In fact, it was the lower end
of technology that failed—bomb fusing set incorrectly, raw
recruits unable to face the rigors of weather and combat.
The degree of technical proficiency attained by most major
South American militaries (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru at
least) is high enough to allow cadre elements to use modern
weapons
.
Whether they can actually get a large number of
troops to fight effectively remains unproven; the conscript
army in the Falklands did not even have the minimum required
training period for recruits by the time it was shipped to
129the islands, so it does not serve as a good example.
Historical evidence from earlier wars, although significantly
out of date, indicates that as in most other armed forces.
had made the economic situation "the cause of much despair."
Wynia, page 144.
128 In 1986, Admiral Jose Merino, commander in chief of
the Chilean Navy and member of the junta, stated that, "If
Garcia wants to reduce his armaments, fine. I need to
increase mine and I am going to increase them." Quoted in
Caretas, 2 November 1987, page 44.
12 9 Train, page 37, asserts that the conscripts enter
service in February and reach proficiency levels in June..
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this is very much a function of leadership, motivation and
the environment, rather than simply numbers and equipment.
Another consideration is whether the nations which
have built up their military can in fact afford to go to war;
For all its high-technology weapons, Argentina was almost
certainly not planning to fight for the Malvinas, and the
expense of the war was a staggering blow to an economy which
was already on the ropes. The current economic crises in
South America would preclude a war of any duration without
extreme domestic hardship; the balance of power as it exists
among the various nations today rules out any quick and easy
victories by an aggressor looking for a "splendid little
B. TYPOLOGIES OF CONFLICT
As discussed in Chapter I, in order to determine the
potential for interstate war in South America in the
foreseeable future, it is necessary to determine the types
and character of regional conflicts. The typology from the
earlier chapter needs to be updated to meet the current world
situation. Wolf Grabendorff provided a basic classification
130in 1981, which has since been updated. Morris and Millan
proposed the following typology based on Grabendorff ' s
analysis :
1) "System-ideological"--democracy vs. dictatorship,
communism vs. capitalism
2) Hegemonic struggles for influence--regional and major
power attempts to project economic, social, or military
power on other states
3) Territorial and border disputes—claims involving
possession and sovereignty over land or water
4) Resource-competition disputes--disputes over verified
or assumed resources in an area
5) Migration-refugee conflicts--result from demographic,
economic, and political factors
^^ Wolf Grabendorff, "Interstate Conflict Behavior and
Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America. " Journal o f
Interamerican^ studies and World Affairs , August 1982'; VUl T^
No": 37 page 291 . Morris and willan updated the typology in
1983, and>?alter Little in 1987.
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Morris and Millan allow that most conflicts between
states tend to fall into several of these categories, rather
than any single one. Thus, Chile and Peru have a
territorial/border dispute and a resource dispute as well.
Walter Little added categories of salience and
persistence to determine if the conflicts have potential for
actual war, and whether they are long-term or short-term. He
contends that, the more longstanding a dispute, the more
likely it is that it can be controlled; hemispheric
flashpoints, he argues, tend to be recent and ideological,
such as the confrontations between Nicaragua and her
neighbors and Cuba and the U.S. This flies in the face of
the South Atlantic War, until one considers that the
Argentines did not see much potential for actual hostilities
when they started the chain of events that set off the
conflict
.
Despite Little's sanguine retrospective, there has been
tension close to war in the near past aside from the
Falklands/Malvinas clash. The three recent major incidents
have been Chile's tensions with Peru and Bolivia (although
Bolivia's military participation would no doubt have been
negligible once again) in 1977-1979; Chile's tensions with
Argentina over the Beagle Channel in 1978; and the Peruvian-
Ecuadorian clashes over the Cordillera del C6ndor (Condor
Ridge) in 1981. While in retrospect they did not lead to
war, at the time it seemed as though war was a distinct
possibility
.
1 . System/Ideological Conflicts
The governments in Guyana and Suriname have both
undergone periods of leftist extremism or radicalism;
Venezuela on the one hand and Brazil on the other have
expressed concern. Discord between Venezuela and Guyana is
focused much more on the territorial disputes between the
states, however, although radicalism could be one of a series
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of pretexts used to justify a Venezuelan move if it were
contemplated. The Guyanese, especially since the death of
Forbes Burnham, have toned down their ties with Cuba and
1 32generally moved toward a more centrist political position.
Brazil had expressed some concern over the radical
regime of Desire Bouterse in Suriname, which has executed
prominent dissidents and had ties with Cuba and Libya. Since
the 1983 U.S. and Caribbean forces intervention in Grenada,
however, Bouterse has significantly reduced the Cuban
presence in his state, has downgraded Libyan connections, and
has gradually moved toward a semblance of democratic rule in
a socialist context. A brutal internal repression against
descendants of runaway slaves ("Bushnegroes") continues,
however, and the Brazilians are no doubt keeping a watchful
eye on their neighbor. If Bouterse' s excesses are
resumed, Brazil may feel obligated to act in its role as a
regional power in much the same way as the U.S. felt
compelled to act in Grenada (making this as much a hegemonic
13 5
as an ideological conflict).
131 In fact, Guyanese concern over a possible Venezuelan
attempt at a military solution was seen as a possible inroad
for Soviet and Cuban penetration. Leiken, page 69.
1 3? Guyana still maintains a reportedly racist black
regime whicn does not allow adequate representation of the
large Asian population in the country. See Gary Brana-Shute.
"Back to the Barracks? Five Years' 'Revo' in Suriname,"
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , Volume 2 8
THT. r; Spring 1986, page 94 .
133 •Bouterse claims he still has "a talking relationship
with Cuba;" the Libyans had promised $100 mil"lion n aid in
1985, but failed to deliver. A large, though not prominent,
Soviet presence remains. Brana-Shute, page 117. On Nov. 25,
1987. a three-party opposition coalition won a lopsided
electoral victory (4t) or 51 seats) in the first election held
since the 1980 coup. Bouterse has said that "regardless of
the results, the revolution will continue," and is not
expected to yield full political power . "Suriname Voters Give
a Strong Rebuff to Military," Tne New York Times, November
27, 1987, page 13.
"Suriname War Is Devastating A Bush Society, " New
York Times , June 17 1987, page 1.
13 5 ...Brazil has acted to increase its ties with Suriname
in order to preempt closer ties with Cuba or Libya; since
1983, Brazil has provided military and economic aid to
Bouterse' s regime. J. Selcher, page 89.
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At the moment there are no other direct
confrontations of this type in South America, except perhaps
as influenced by geopolitical thinking. Colombia has a
dispute with Nicaragua over possession of the San Andres
islands, but the conflict is unlikely to escalate, and has
little relation to ideology.
Of greater concern are potential extremist regimes
which might come to power in the near future; Peru faces an
election in 1989 where a United Left (communist) candidate,
Alfonso Barrantes, has a good chance of being elected.
Neighboring extreme-right regimes such as Chile's would view
this with concern. Though far less likely, a final
victory by Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru or M19 in
Colombia would be seen as a definite threat by neighboring
states, including Brazil, Venezuela, and Chile.
While prospects for war seem dim at the moment, a
possible far-Left regime in Peru could use widespread anti-
Chilean feeling (see below) to bolster the ideological
differences, and to co-opt a potentially hostile military.
Peru would not want to take on Chile singlehandedly in a
military contest given the current correlation of forces, and
is unlikely to find allies in the near future; however, a
confrontation between a far-Leftist Peruvian regime and
Pinochet's Chile could provide an excellent opportunity for
greatly increased Soviet aid to and penetration of Peru, even
to the point where the correlation of forces could be tipped
in Peru's favor.
Cuban ideological influence continues to surface in
the form of guerrilla groups and other organizations which
advocate the violent overthrow of South American governments.
At the very least, relations would be highly
strained. The United Left maintains close ties with Moscow,
which sees Pinochet as the bete noire of reactionary
oppression in Latin America, and advocates the violent
overthrow of his regime. Pinochet has little to offer the
left except as he puts it, "la mano dura" (the hard hand) .
See Thomas C. Bruneau and Mary Mooney, A Political Transition
in Chile? (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1987), pags 14.
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While Castro's prestige has been somewhat tarnished by events
in recent years, he remains a powerful symbol for the South
American left, and he still harbors ambitions which far
exceed the limits of his island.
Cuba's principal toeholds in South America, Suriname
and Guyana, have moved away from Castro; his principal threat
now comes from the revolutionary movements in several
countries. There are very probable ties between
Revolutionary Left (MIR) in Chile, 19th March Armed Group
(M19) in Colombia, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
in Peru, and Havana. These groups are more likely to cause
internal rather than interstate war unless one of them
succeeds in toppling an established regime--an unlikely
event
.
2 . Hegemonic/Influence Conflicts
a. South American Hegemonism
Brazil's self-image of manifest destiny, or
"grandeza", and Argentina's perception of its own role as a
leader of the Spanish-speaking nations has led to some
friction over "spheres of influence" (see section on
geopolitics below) . Political and economic control over the
traditional buffer states, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia,
and their resources is the prize; Argentina is conscious of
Brazil's designs, and in the early 1980' s voiced opposition
to joint Brazilian-Paraguayan construction of the Itaipu
hydroelectric dam project on the Parana/Plata system.
The Itaipu issue has been resolved, and the dam
project is largely completed; although Argentina retains a
long-term view, the current Argentine regime is beset with
enough domestic problems, and its remembrance of war is near-
term enough, that abstruse issues such as this would probably
have little impact. Again, a sudden regime change in Buenos




Brazil, due to its economic and geographic
enormity relative to its neighbors, would be a logical
candidate to regional leadership if not outright hegemony.
Overall, however, "Brazil has refused the roles of 1)
continental hegemony (Colossus of the South), 2) vociferous
Third World champion, or 3) U.S. regional surrogate or
ally." Brazil's relations with all its neighbors are
excellent; while preferring bilateral relations, Brazil has
also been active in regional groups, probably to ensure that
it remains attuned to its Spanish-speaking neighbors'
concerns. As pointed out earlier, Brazil's growing arms
industry has not yet become a major political factor in Latin
America, nor has Brazil made any significant overt
interventory political or military moves toward her
13 8
neighbors, other than unstable Suriname.
b. Extrahemispheric Actors
Conflicts of this type in South America are not
limited to the nations on the continent; they include
external actors such as the United States and the Soviet
Union, both of which have political and economic interests in
the region. The risk is that South American states could get
caught up in the competition between the superpowers.
Part of the process of political and economic
diversification which the South American countries have
attempted in the last two decades, with varying degrees of
success, has involved establishing ties with the U.S.S.R.,
its satellites, and other communist countries. The range of
these ties has extended from the ideological rapport of the
Allende regime to the arms purchases by Peru, to the complete
cutoff of relations by Pinochet.
"^^ Selcher, page 71.
1 op
Brazil's influence on Paraguay has been driven by
economic interests rather than any stated hegemonic
principles. The economic integration of the two states may
have some significance for conflict in the future, especially
if there is major unrest in Paraguay after Stroessner.
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The first South American state to establish
diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. was Peronist Argentina
in 1946/ Brazil followed in 1959, and by 1971 Chile, Peru,
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela had followed suit. These
ties were more often an expression of autonomy from the U.S.
and a sop to local leftists than a prelude to significant
economic or political links to a superpower; by and large,
the Soviets have been kept at arm's length.
The economic side of relations with Moscow became
important in Peru and Argentina during the 1970' s. Largely
due to its arms purchases, Peru currently owes the U.S.S.R.
close to $500 million; the Soviets have agreed to purchase
Peruvian-built fishing craft in exchange for some debt
reduction. Argentina is a net creditor of the U.S.S.R.;
grain and meat exports to the Soviets began during the U.S.
grain embargo of 1975 ($22 million) and grew to $1.65 billion
140 . . ...by 1984. The Soviets have met with some difficulty in
trying to pay the Argentines.
Moscow's attitude toward revolution was
significantly different from Havana's; the "focos" sponsored
by Castro received little support from the Soviets or their
local stooges. The Soviets strongly supported "progressive"
military regimes which combated focos, believing that the
"new" development-oriented military was willing to move
toward communism; the Allende government's experience with
its military shook this faith, and increased Soviet
reluctance to establish deep commitment in the region.
13 9 The Soviets have also contracted to build a $600
million port in Peru in the near future. This may have
strategic implications if basing rights for the Soviet
fishing/research/intelligence-collection fleet are included.
See Augusto Varas, "Soviet-Latin American Relations under the
U.S. Regional Hegemony," in Augusto Varas, ed., Soviet-Latin





* *^ Aldo C. Vacs, "From Hostility to Partnership: The
New Character of Soviet-Argentine Relations," in Varas
(1987)
^
page 187. The trade with Argentina has included
supplying Argentine breeder reactors with heavy water.
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Soviet subversion in South America is carried out
in more subtle fashion than through focos, employing such
measures as indoctrination of personnel sent to study in the
Soviet Union or its satellites, and Soviet and surrogate
personnel in country. Overt ties between the Soviets and
South American states, barring a bona fide communist party
takeover, will remain cautious; the Soviets are very unlikely
at the present time to be willing to take a major risk and
make a large political, economic, and military investment in
South America with little hope of return in the foreseeable
future. Even a communist regime will still be kept at a
distance, at least until the local military's political
stance and threshold of tolerance are made clear.
Establishment of a Soviet military presence in
South America would represent a significant setback for the
U.S., but could also frighten neighboring states and lead to
U.S. military action. Any such move by the Soviets would
have to be carefully weighed in terms of accomplishments of
141strategic objectives.
Of equal importance, the doctrines of the leftist
military movements of the 1970' s had strong nationalist,
anti-dependency overtones; while the Peruvians, for example,
purchased Soviet weapons (and the Argentines sold grain to
the U.S.S.R), they were unwilling to trade U.S. for Soviet
"hegemonism. " The more conservative military of today is
even less likely to accept such a situation. The far more
well-established national character and armed forces of South
America make the prospect of an expeditionary force similar
to the one in Angola, or an extremely large and dominant
Cuban presence such as in Nicaragua, difficult to imagine.
141 . . . . . .Jaime Suchlicki, "Soviet Policy in Latin America:
Implications for the United States", in Journal of
Interamerican Studies, and World Affairs
,
Volume T9 NU~. ty
Sptiftg 1987, p^g6 39 . Witness ilSo Moscow' s extreme
reluctance to get caught in the middle of the confrontation
between nominal ally Libya and the U.S. in a theater much
closer to home.
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The Soviets would profit more, at less expense,
by playing on the U . S . -dependency theme and weakening
political, economic, and military-strategic South American
links with the U.S. wherever possible than by attempting to
set up an alternate economic and military structure of their
own
.
The prospects for a sudden, direct, ideologically
motivated confrontation between the superpowers in South
America are therefore negligible under existing
circumstances, since Moscow lacks both the support from
within and the commitment it must provide itself. The
Soviets would probably avoid of their own accord a
relationship, with any Iberian South American country, which
would be pervasive enough to generate (or to place them in
140
the midst of) a military confrontation with the U.S.
While this limits Moscow's active role for increased
penetration in the area, the U.S.S.R. will be quick to seize
any opportunity that it can use for the discomfiture of U.S.
policy and standing in the region without entailing serious
confrontation or expenditure.
3 . Territorial and Border Disputes
This type of conflict is one of the most prevalent
and persistent in South America (for its origins see chapter
143
I) . The most serious ongoing disputes of this sort are
between Argentina and the United kingdom, Ecuador and Peru,
Bolivia-Peru-Chile, Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia and
Venezuela, and Guyana and Venezuela. Of these, the latter
two are unlikely to lead to any military conflict (all
involved are pledged to resolve the disputes peacefully) but
142 The Soviets refer to U.S. ability to exert influence
in the area as "geographic fatalism." Suchlicki, page 25.
143 Morris and Millan (page 4) identify 28 of these m
South America. Child (1985, page 13) separates border and
territorial conflicts into separate categories; border
conflicts result from the "strains and tensions that seem to
emerge almost inevitably when two sovereignties meet at a
frontier, " while territorial conflicts are those in the more
generally understood category of disputes over the possession
and sovereign rights of portions of the earth's surface.
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could become an additional complicating factor if relations
deteriorated over more pressing migration, resource, or
ideological problems among the states.
The Argentine-United Kingdom conflict was discussed
in greater detail in the introduction. While the territorial
aspect has been the most persistent in this conflict over the
years, it is no longer as significant a barrier to its
overall resolution as are more complicated resource,
political-ideological, and population issues.
The dispute between Peru and Ecuador centers on the
same territory which the two nations fought over in 1941.
Ecuador has denounced the 1942 Rio Treaty, and persists in
its demands on access to the Amazon headwaters and the
Zarumilla-Tumbes area.
A 1981 incident actually led to fighting along the
poorly marked border, with some casualties. Nationalist
agitation added to military restiveness in newly elected
civilian governments in both countries, and consequent desire
by the respective presidents to show that they were capable
of firm action, led to a clash. Peru responded by calling up
reserves and moving forces north. While Ecuador has used its
oil revenue to purchase a respectable inventory, Peru remains
144
an overwhelming opponent in any bilateral action.
The emotionalism displayed over this dispute on both
sides of the border, and the relative enormity of the claim
(it would double Ecuador's present size) make it highly
145
unlikely that it will be resolved or will fade away. The
ease with which Peru has historically dealt with Ecuador
militarily make this border dispute particularly troublesome,
since in the past it has provided the Peruvian military and
^^^ Varas (1985), page 98.
For the Ecuadorians, the Amazon "holds a special
place in the national consciousness.... Demands for its
restitution became a perennial theme of Ecuadorian political
debate." David W. Schodt, Ecuador: An Andean Enigma
(Boulder: Westview Press, 198/), page 54
.
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Nevertheless, Peruvian President Garcia has gone some
way toward attempting to resolve the issue, with his foreign
minister visiting Ecuador in 1986--the first time since
before the 1941 war.
Bolivia has persisted in its desire for an outlet to
the sea since the Chileans seized Bolivia's coast in 1880.
In the past, Chile repeatedly played Bolivia and Peru against
one another; more recently, it has simply failed to provide
Bolivia with any acceptable option for access to the sea.
For the Chileans, this is as much a hegemony/influence issue
as a territorial one; Bolivia is irretrievably linked to
Chilean interests as long as her principal access to the sea
is through Chile. For Bolivia, the issue is one of resources
as well as territory. Bolivia broke relations with Chile
over both resources and boundaries from 1962 to 1975, and
over the coastal access issue from 1978 to 1983. Despite the
rupture in relations, much of Bolivia's trade still uses
Chilean ports, and close economic ties between the two
states, added to Chile's overwhelming military superiority,
make any prospect of a bilateral war difficult to imagine.
While the territorial issue between Chile and Peru
was technically settled in 1929, anti-Chilean feeling
continues to run high. Chile's right-wing 1973 coup gave
Peru's left-wing government an incentive to increase its
armament. By 1977, with the centennial of the War of the
Pacific approaching, nationalist tensions on both sides, plus
the everlasting Bolivian dream of access to the sea, reached
a crescendo. In addition to the arms race, Chilean
diplomatic and military personnel were expelled from Peru for
14 6 The largest concentration of Peruvian forces is
along the Zarumilla sector of the border with Ecuador;
Ecuador in turn deploys both of its mechanized brigades and
four of its six divisions in the southern region. English,
pages 252 and 401. Although English points out that Ecuador
has upgraded its inventory and training since the oil boom,
its military is still no match for Peru.
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spying (a Peruvian soldier was executed for treason in the
affair), and the Peruvian ambassador to Chile was recalled.
Trilateral military talks among the participants
allowed for reduction of tension and for confidence-building
measures. The centennial passed without incident, and more
cordial relations became the rule with the return of civilian
rule to Peru in 1980. The current Peruvian government,
while no friend of Pinochet's, has continued efforts to
reduce tensions along the border.
The dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua centers on
the San Andres Islands in the Caribbean. When the
Sandinistas came to power in 1979, (despite Colombian support
for their cause during the Nicaraguan Revolutionary War) they
resurrected claims to the islands, which had been settled by
U.S. arbitration in Colombia's favor in 1929. Colombia's
president Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala secretly reinforced the
islands with troops and aircraft, then disclosed the fact to
148 . . . .deter aggression. Nicaragua's geographic proximity is
offset by its military weakness vis-a-vis Colombia, and by
U.S. repugnance toward the Sandinista regime, which would
make U.S. support for Colombia likely in any military
confrontation
.
One major boundary dispute which threatened regional
peace has been resolved. Differences between Argentina and
Chile over three islands in the Beagle Channel led in 1978 to
the breaking of relations between the states, mobilization of
the Chilean and Argentine armies, and blackouts in Buenos
Aires. The two states had seemingly developed an excellent
rapport after the overthrow of Peron's widow and her advisor
in 1976, but when Argentina refused to accept the result of
British mediation in 1978 relations deteriorated immediately.
A papal offer of mediation was tendered; both antagonists
agreed to settle their differences peacefully. Relations
^^'^ Merrill, page 182
^^^ Calvert, page 18.
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between the two states remained uneven, especially when
Chile's support for Argentina in the South Atlantic War
proved ambiguous
.
Papal mediation decisions were accepted by Chile and
resoundingly approved in an Argentine referendum in 1984,
definitively settling the issue, although Argentine
14 9
ultranationalists remain displeased. This dispute had
hegemonic and resource overtones which actually overrode the
territorial aspect; however, the papally mediated boundary
provided a compromise which resolved these issues, at least
for the moment, and thereby removed a medium in which other
disputes could develop. The surprising willingness of both
sides to reach an agreement based on compromise also bodes
well for future integrationist solutions to problems.
4 . Resource Conflicts
This type of conflict has been around for over a
century in South America; it arguably led to the War of the
Triple Alliance, and certainly was the driving factor behind
Chile's actions in the War of the Pacific. Suspected oil
deposits also played a role in the Chaco War. The issue
remains of central importance at a time when control of
resources can be critical for the weakened economies of the
continent
.
One of the potential threat areas in this respect is
the "Seventh Continent, " Antarctica; Peter Beck writes ,
Indeed, some even depict the continent as a future
"casus belli." The early 1980' s... demonstrated an
increased tendency by governments to refer to the
Antarctic not only as an international problem, but also
as a potential crisis point.
Chile and Argentina have conflicting territorial
claims, and both have conflicts with British claims. The
^^^ Merrill, page 201. Garrett (page 104) claims that a
majority of Argentines consider it resolved and want to get
on with more pressing issues.
1 SO Peter J. Beck, The International Politics of
Antarctica
,
(New York: St. Martin's Pr6§5, 1986), p^^^ 309.
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boundary disputes over a barren wasteland are relatively
meaningless unless one considers the resource issues
involved; the squid and krill (a small shrimp with a high
protein content) fisheries in southern waters have made the
Falklands the busiest shipping area in the Southern
Hemisphere for several weeks each year. In addition,
there are reports of oil and other mineral resources on the
1 S2
continental shelf.
Chile and Argentina both maintain research stations
in Antarctica; they have deliberately settled families at the
stations to prove that they have "inhabited" the areas they
claim (the first baby born in Antarctica was Argentine).
Although Argentine forces are the only ones to have allegedly
fired shots in anger in Antarctica (against the British in
1952), they did not carry out any hostile actions against
British stations in their vicinity during the South Atlantic
war. 154
The entire dispute over the Antarctic has been
shelved since 1961, when the United Nations-sponsored 1959
Antarctic Treaty was ratified. According to Article IV of
the treaty, all territorial claims will be held in abeyance
for the duration of the treaty, and no further claims made
while it is extant can be recognized. The treaty does not
151 Luis H. Mericq, Antarctica: Chile's Claim
(Washington D.C.: National DefehS6 UhiV6rSity Pr6SS,—1987)
,
page 23.
15? . .Deborah Shapley, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica
in a Resource Age (Washington u . u. : Kesources TUr ZTTe
Futurs, 1985), page 124.
1 s?
^'^ The child was born m January 1978 at the Argentine
base in Esperanza. In similar efforts to establish a
presence, Chile sent six families to its Teniente Marsh base
m 1984. Beck, page 129.
1 t:4 ....A British inspection team (Article VII states that
all installations are open to inspection at any time) in
March 1982 found 23 military personnel, only two or whom were
doing scientific research, at the Argentine San Martin base;
Chilean stations are about the same. This leaves open the
question of whether the bases are maintained for scientific
or strategic reasons. Beck, page 72. Beck also provides a
full description of the 1952 incident on pages 3"4 and 35;




rule on the legitimacy of the claims; it is a non-solution,
simply a peace-keeping measure which freezes them.
The treaty will be up for revision in 1991; in the
current climate of relations between Argentina and Chile
after peaceful resolution of the Beagle Channel dispute,
there are no indications that either party will call for an
end to the treaty or for final resolution of territorial
155
claims in Antarctica. Complicating that issue would be
the presence of numerous other nations on Antarctica, some of
which--including the U.S.—do not recognize the validity of
territorial claims. Third World attitudes toward keeping
Antarctica as a world resource would tend to support this
1 C /T
stance rather than any strict sovereignty claims.
In addition to the political undesirability of a war
at this time, military operations in such a remote and
inhospitable region would be difficult, expensive, and
hazardous simply from the weather and terrain. The
possibility of a military conflict over resources and ground
space in Antarctica itself is therefore limited in the
foreseeable future. A more likely scenario for a clash could
involve patrol vessels confronting each other over fishing
rights--especially British and Argentine units; however, the
reinforced British presence in the region would make it
difficult for the Argentines, with their weakened naval
strength, to present a credible opponent.
Another Southern Cone conflict which bears on
resources is between Chile and Argentina in Patagonia. While
the boundary issue is settled in the region, the Argentines
worry about large numbers of Chilean illegal immigrants to
the area. Patagonia is the source for much of Argentina's
155 . .Although the settlement specifically did not address
the Antarctic claims that would result from extending the
agreed-upon boundary southward.
Chilean author Luis Mericg (page 43) proposes a
solution between "internationalization" and the present
Antarctic Treaty System, allowing eventual association to




petroleum, and Buenos Aires finds the presence of numerous
potentially hostile aliens in the thinly-populated but
strategic zone disturbing. This became something of an issue
in the wake of allegations that Chile had collaborated with
the British in the far south; however, it is unlikely that
this issue will cause a major rift between the two nations in
the foreseeable future. Its complicated links with
demographics illustrate the difficulty of defining the limits
and causes of conflict in South America.
5 . Demographic Conflicts
Aside from the Chilean-Argentine demographic conflict
in Patagonia, there is also a demographic dispute between
Colombia and Venezuela which heats up periodically. Poor
Colombians for several years illegally immigrated to
Venezuela, which had a more robust legal economy than
Colombia; the influx of Colombians was at first beneficial
for both sides, since Venezuela needed the cheap labor and
the departure of the Colombians from their home country
relieved population and unemployment pressures. When oil
prices went down in the early 1980' s, and the Venezuelan
economy staggered, the Colombians became redundant and were
seen as a major economic burden. Reports of ill-treatment
and mass deportation of Colombians by Venezuela resulted in
demonstrations and acts of violence against Venezuelans in
Colombia. Despite flareups in popular opinion, the
democratic regimes in Colombia and Venezuela are committed to
peaceful resolution of any disputes.
Similarly, Brazil's heavy outward flow of cross-
border migration toward its buffer states (Paraguay, Bolivia,
Uruguay) and French Guiana are not likely to cause military
clashes, if only due to Brazil's economic and military
157preponderance vis-a-vis the smaller states . Franco-
^ Selcher (page 93) believes that "although binational
cooperation^ rather than confrontation is the most probable
outcome, still some disagreements are likely to occur."
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Brazilian ties would probably allow for peaceful resolution
of any conflicts over Guiana.
6 . Geopolitics: The Critical Link?
The geopolitical approach to politics perceives the
state as "a living organism, which requires living space,
resources, and a purpose; the state also has a life cycle in
which it is created, matures, declines, and finally
1 S 8disappears." Its essential elements include its people
(number, strength, culture) , its territory (size, location,
minerals and topography) , and its sovereignty (its freedom to
-ICQ
act in its own best interests). The organic viewpoint
frequently presents the relationship between two states as
competitive whenever they come into contact,
a. Aggressive Geopolitics
Geopolitical thinking was initially the preserve
of European political philosophers who went into disfavor in
the West after the fall of Fascism; nevertheless, in South
America, especially among right-wing military elements, it
found a new home. The organic concept was expanded to
include internal disorders that weakened and threatened the
state, and therefore had to be extirpated. Since survival of
the state was crucial to all its components, the individual
was subordinated to the whole. Geopolitics dovetailed nicely
with authoritarianism and the concept of the national
security developmentalist state.
The zenith of geopolitical thinking in terms of
the national security state was reached in the mid-1970' s,
when conservative military regimes dominated almost all of
South America. Brazil, Chile and Argentina had fairly well-
developed schools of thought on the matter, each implementing
the philosophy in its own way. The concept of
sovereignty/autarchy, which is predicated on reduced
dependence, provided an excellent rationale for indigenous
^^^ Child, page 20.
^^^ Varas (1985), page 16
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arms production and diversification of arms sources. The
strong nationalist tendencies implicit in geopolitics favored
aggressive action against neighboring states, especially if a
resource conflict was involved. The need to "extirpate
malignant growths" justified extraordinary measures for
dealing with internal subversion, real or imagined. While no
causal link can be developed between the national security
state and aggressive geopolitical thinking in South America,
the South Atlantic War and all three of the major recent
interstate incidents involved geopolitically-oriented armed
forces. ^^°
Brazil's brand of geopolitics is embodied in the
concept of "grandeza, " which sees Brazil as destined to
become the next superpower. This has clear geopolitical
implications for Brazil and also for its neighbors, who will
then be in the uncomfortable position of being next to a
superpower. The traditional Argentine geopolitical
perception is that Argentina's destiny of greatness has been
frustrated repeatedly by external forces and their internal
manifestations; Brazil represents a rival in the area, trying
to deprive Argentina of her rightful place as leader of
Iberian America. Brazil has thus far not shown any signs of
planning to play that role forcefully or soon.
Chile' s claim over the Beagle Channel islands
also represented a threat to Argentine aspirations of
undisputed mastery over the South Atlantic. Argentine
geopoliticians feel that Chile belongs in the Pacific, and
Argentina in the Atlantic; Chilean claims were seen as
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contesting Argentine strategic control.
1 fiO
"^ Jack Child, "Geopolitical Thinking," unpublished
paper, for inclusion in forthcoming book, Louis W. Goodman
and Juan Riel, eds
.
, Civil Military Relations in Latin
America: The Military and Pow^r , C. August 1987.
1 fii
^ James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Channel: Confrontation
and Negotiation in tne Southern Cone, " Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Volume 21 Number Tj
Fail 1985, page 85.
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The last remaining dictator who came to power in
South America in the 1970' s is Chile's Augusto Pinochet, who
is himself an avid geopolitician . Chilean geopolitical
perspectives center on retention of the gains of the War of
the Pacific, and on exploiting the resources which the sea
provides Chile. The nation is surrounded by hostile
neighbors, and the principle of "discontinuous borders" must
be considered when seeking allies; Brazil, which has no
border with Chile but shares a border with Argentina, is an
LS r
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ideal ally. The feeling is not mutual though, and Brazil
prefers to keep its distance.
While the military governments in Brazil, Peru,
and Argentina have been replaced by civilians, there is
recurrent instability in those countries, and there is
willingness among sectors of the military to return to power
if the situation allows or "demands" it. Aggressive
geopolitical thinking could again become a significant factor
in conflict generation if the current economic malaise
worsens and competition for scarce resources is perceived as
critical for national survival.
b. Integrationism: The Case of Brazil
Nevertheless, the seemingly strong grip which the
geopolitically-oriented military governments exerted on South
America has been broken for the moment, to be replaced by its
other, brighter aspects: internal and integrationist
geopolitics. In the former aspect, geopolitics involves the
intelligent development, exploitation and utilization of
national territory; in the latter, it espouses joint
development of frontiers and pooling of resources. Brazil
16? Sample quote (from 1978) : "However much one wants to
think of law as an equalizing element among categories of
nations, one always confronts the hard reality that the
strongest country... has an advantage in the litigation of
frontiers." Garrett, page 84.
^^^ Child (1985), pages 52-55.
164 . . ... . .Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign Ministry) maintains
only "proper" relations with Pinochet. Selcher, page 71.
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has been practicing the latter aspect even since its national
security state phase, as noted by the joint development
project with Paraguay at Itaipu.
C. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
After its failures in 1979, when the OAS rejected a U.S.
request to send a multinational peacekeeping mission to
Nicaragua, and in 1982 when it proved unable to take
effective action to avert the South Atlantic War, the
credibility of the organization has been seriously damaged.
Ad hoc organizations such as the Contadora Group and the
Arias Peace Plan have received much attention; however,
efforts made in recent years at establishing long-term,
general arms limitation agreements, and permanent
interamerican organizations with conflict control functions,
have produced few substantive results. South American
countries are apparently most reluctant to limit their
options by creating a regional supranational entity with
obligational capability.
1 . Arms Limitation Agreements
Two of the most prominent arms control agreements in
recent years include the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the
Ayacucho Declaration.
a. The Treaty of Tlatelolco
Even before the Non-Proliferation Treaty was
opened for signing in July 1968, several Latin American
nations came up with a regional treaty of their own. The
treaty included provisions for ensuring compliance; it was
signed by a number of countries including the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. from 1967 to 1978. Argentina is the only regional
country which has not ratified the treaty; Brazil and Chile
have reservations in their ratifications which keep the
treaty from entering into force. In addition, Brazil and
Argentina take Article 18 of the treaty to mean that
^^^ Child, page 37
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"peaceful nuclear explosions are allowed." Thus, the
treaty fails to obtain a viable commitment from precisely
those nations which are most likely to have the capability
and the willingness to build or develop a nuclear weapon,
b. The Ayacucho Declaration
In 1974, the Peruvian revolutionary military
government called for a meeting of several countries in the
region to discuss arms reduction and confidence-building
measures. A joint declaration was signed in the Peruvian
city of Ayacucho in December 1974 by Argentina, Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela;
signatories agreed to "promote and support the building of a
lasting order of peace and cooperation, " to create a climate
of limited arms sales, and to stop buying offensive weapons.
Political realities quickly showed the limitations of
the "Spirit of Ayacucho, " however; the same month the
declaration was signed, Peru's acquisition of 250 Soviet T-55
tanks was revealed, with obvious consequences to its
neighbors' posture on disarmament. In addition, Brazil's
non-participation despite being invited to attend was
considered a key failure.
Despite these obvious weaknesses, further
attempts to expand the spirit of Ayacucho were made;
Peruvian, Bolivian and Chilean border region military
commanders agreed to meet regularly in the late 1970' s to
avoid any accidental confrontations. These meetings have met
with mixed success, but are still important in preventing
individual miscalculations or irrationality by an isolated
actor. Nevertheless, in his evaluation of the Ayacucho
Declaration participants. Max G. Manwaring finds that despite
the disarmament interest of the 1970' s, "there has been a
general proliferation of military capability, a diffusion of
1 fi 6 Michael A. Morris and Martin Slann, "Proliferation
of Weaponry and Technology," in Morris and Millan, pages 141-
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power among a growing number of states, and thus a general
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weakening of security."
2 . The Role of Regional Organizations
The Antarctic Treaty Organization, perhaps due to its
unique and narrow geographic focus and deferred (or non-)
solution outlook has been a success story for almost thirty
years. In addition, several attempts have been made since
the early 1970' s to form other organizations which could
provide conflict control functions among regional nations. A
brief overview of some of these efforts is provided,
a. SELA
The Latin American Economic System (Sistema
Economico Latinoamericano, or SELA) was the brainchild of
Venezuela's activist president Carlos Andres Perez, who had
ambitions of Third World leadership; the implications of SELA
went far beyond economics and were highly politicized.
Among the prominent features of the 1975 charter for the
organization were the exclusion of the United States and the
inclusion of Cuba. Every South American nation was a member.
The organization is made up of three organs: the Latin
American Council, the Secretariat, and the Action Committees.
The military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile
expressed opposition to any moves which might make the group
a supranational organization, which depoliticized the
organization to some extent. It has retained some features
which could make it helpful in conflict control, chiefly by
providing a forum for dialogue and multilateral approaches to
problem solving.
SELA' s brightest moment in conflict control came
during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, when the Assembly
1 fi 7 Max Manwaring, "Monitoring Latin American Arms
Control Agreements," in Morris and Millan, eds
. ,
page 170.
John D. Martz, "Venezuelan Foreign Policy and the
Role of Political Parties," in Heraldo Munoz and Joseph S.
Tulchin, eds., Latin American Nations in World Politics
(Boulder and London:—westview—Press, .1984) ,
—
pa^^—137 ._The
charter simply called for cooperating in economic and social
matters, and providing a forum for consultation.
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passed a resolution (to which Chile, Colombia, and the
virtually all of the Western Hemisphere Anglophone states
dissented) condemning Great Britain and the U.S. -EEC embargo
against Argentina. Even this display of (broken) solidarity
accomplished nothing; economic and military aid to Argentina
was very much on a bilateral rather than multilateral--much
less Latin American—basis. SELA has no real power other
than moral suasion to enforce compliance, however, and the
mistrust, differences, and disputes that characterize Latin
American relationships make attempts at conflict resolution
problematic. SELA might become more effective if it were
incorporated or associated with the OAS system.
b. The Andean Pact
Members of the Andean Pact (Bolivia, Peru,
Ecuador, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela) drew up a treaty
creating a Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement in
1979, with compulsory jurisdiction; however, the treaty has
to date not been ratified by the member states.
3 . Implications
The failure of the South American states to create a
regional organization which could replace the OAS, empowered
to limit, control, or resolve conflict or conflict-
producing situations through an enforceable mandate does not
point to an increased willingness on the part of any of the
states to engage in hostile military action. Rather, it
indicates that fears of neighbors' internal stability (a
sudden change of governments could mean a reversal of foreign
policy) and historical distrust or antagonism toward nations
in the region (the United States among them) are still alive.
It also shows that the various nations are not
satisfied with the solutions provided by earlier
organizations, such as the OAS or the United Nations.
Belonging to any such organization would also diminish a
169 Carlos Moneta, "The Latin American Economic System





state's flexibility and, to a certain extent, its
sovereignty; the current political mainstream in South
America no doubt places this latter principle above that of
the rule of international law as decided by outside parties.
The current integrationist climate has produced conflict-
resolution bodies such as the Contadora Group for other
areas; whether this would work in the much larger geographic,
demographic, and military scale of South America is doubtful.
At the same time, integrationism and the democratic character
of the governments in South America (only Chile and Paraguay
still have full dictatorships) will ease bilateral actions
that reduce conflict. The Alfonsin and Garcia governments
have both demonstrated that they are serious about peace, and
170their efforts to that end will continue.
17 Through such events as the Beagle Channel dispute
resolution (Argentina) and the efforts to improve relations





A. PROSPECTS FOR CONFLICT
1 . Possible Scenarios
As examined in this thesis, the roots of conflict in
South America go back in many cases for over a century; they
are, in Little's typology, persistent and often salient.
Many of them are rooted in factors which do not present any
hope of a rational, much less a near-term, solution. Recent
increases in warfighting capability in terms of arsenals,
troop deployments, infrastructure, and demographics, in
conjunction with an apparent reduction in conflict control
mechanisms, in some analysts' opinion make the outbreak of
war in South America seem inevitable.
Nevertheless, from a historical and a contemporary
perspective, the present situation in South America is not
conducive to the outbreak of interstate war as defined
earlier. Study of the few South American wars which have
taken place over the years indicates that the aggressor was
generally in a favorable economic situation, the war or
initial aggression had popular support in the perpetrating
state during the early stages, and the initiator enjoyed at
least a momentary substantial military advantage in the
theater of operations. Considering the current economic
straits and the relative military balance on the continent
today, these three criteria would be hard to meet.
The most likely exception would be a renewed outbreak
of armed violence between Peru and Ecuador, at least in the
form of low-intensity conflict, where at least two of those
three criteria could be met. This possibility is diminished
by the current Peruvian regime's activist foreign policy,
which is driven by President Garcia' s desire to appear as a
conciliatory Third World statesman, rather than a belligerent
nationalist leader. The existence of tensions in the area
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provides the military with a mission and a raison d^etre ;
Garcia obviously realizes that a diminution of tension would
also diminish the military's importance.
The Peruvian President's internal subversion problems
are apparently driven just as much by indiscriminate
extremists (Shining Path) as they are by Cuban-inspired
terrorists (MRTA) interested in weakening progressive
democracy. This low-intensity conflict has reached a point
where Garcia cannot do without the military, and as a result
it has by and large been fought on the armed forces' terms
rather than the government's.
Conflict involving Argentina is unlikely due to the
recency and totality of the defeat in the South Atlantic War,
and the unpopularity of the war and of military leadership in
its aftermath. Although the Thatcher government so far has
proven unwilling to negotiate in a constructive fashion, and
Alfonsin cannot be reelected under the present constitution,
the Argentines must realize the situation cannot be resolved
in their favor through continued military action.
The Argentine military probably recognizes that due
to economic pressure alone the British will eventually have
to reach some kind of agreement on the Falklands-Malvinas; in
the interim, Her Majesty' s Government are building what
amounts to an excellent future Argentine naval/military
facility on the islands which will enable Argentina to come
closer to her dream of controlling the far South Atlantic.
The greatest threat in the area at this time is from
the political and military momentum which could build up in
Argentina following even a minor confrontation between
British and Argentine elements—such as fishing or research
vessels—operating in the disputed zone. Given the policy
moves demonstrated in the recent past, the current
government would probably attempt to minimize the effect of
any such clash; however, other groups inside Argentina could
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use any conciliatory action by the government to accuse it of
pusillanimity or capitulationism.
Even if a more belligerent group manages to obtain
political control in Argentina, though, it will have a very
difficult time convincing the nation to go to war again.
Recent Gallup studies show a large proportion of Argentines
consider theirs to be the country working hardest for peace
171in Latin America.
2 . Driving Forces
The eventual establishment of internal stability
through subordination of the military to democratic civilian
rule remains the central issue in this regard for most
nations. An autarkic military could decide for reasons of
its own, including simply to demonstrate its power vis-a-vis
the civilian government, to carry out against a neighboring
state an action which could well be irreversible; the
Peruvian military came just short of doing this against
Ecuador in 1981.
The current geopolitical orientation of the military
leadership in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, coupled with a
perceived need by an autonomous military or by a putschist
regime seeking legitimacy, could create conditions leading to
a confrontation. Aggressive nationalism is more easily
courted and more philosophically accessible to geopolitical
thinkers than regional integration.
The internal security role emphasized in past U.S.172.training
,
and reinforced by domestic necessity, has moved
the South American military even closer to politics; as long
as the insurgencies are not contained in Peru and Colombia at
least, the military will perforce remain an important factor
due to their influence on the domestic front. Paradoxically,
^^^ See Selcher, page 94.
172 Recent U.S. joint operations and exercises, such as
Operation Condor in Peru and Bolivia, have concentrated on
drug eradication, an internal security problem with
implications for U.S. security.
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if and when the guerrilla threat is eliminated, this will
leave a large military which will have external security as
its chief mission, and may seek ways of reminding the
government that it is still required in order to cope with
threats from abroad.
The concept that arms control agreements and
conflict-resolving organizations, and U.S. involvement in
them, are a viable solution is problematic due not only to
nationalist tendencies and the desire to retain flexibility,
but also to the occasional irrationality or the non-
governmental factors which could trigger a major military
confrontation, such as the ones which served as catalysts for
the Peruvian-Colombian clashes and to a lesser extent the
171South Atlantic War. These triggers admittedly belie the
existence of deep-rooted conflicts and tensions, which such
organizations or agreements might reduce; conflict-control
mechanisms have been established on a bilateral basis (for
example on the Peru-Chile border through regular military-to-
military talks) precisely to avoid the eventuality of
independent action by isolated groups.
Still, the tide of events might preclude the
application of constraints which would allow rational
settlement. This is especially true in those regimes which,
due to internal instability, are incapable of controlling a
situation or of exercising sufficient freedom of movement to
forestall the outbreak of war.
The bottom line is that the current democratic
governments, with their integrationist and conciliatory
1 7 o
The Leticia affair, for example,. was begun by
civilians, and the Peruvian government felt it could not back
down or it could fall from power. The South Atlantic War was
similar in some respects, (misunderstandings when civilians
planted an Argentine flag on South Georgia) but the Junta
(Adm, Anaya) did not want to back down, and took a calculated
risk based on an incorrect assessment of the political and
military situation in Britain. In the current situation,
opportunistic elements in the military or the opposition in
both Peru and Argentina could intentionally place the
government in a situation where any concessions would
diminish its credentials regarding sovereignty.
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outlook, represent the best security against the outbreak of
war in South America. If the vicious circle of South
American coups repeats itself, as it did after the so-called
"Twilight of the Tyrants" in the 1950' s, the risks of war
will be greatly increased. Corporate or bureaucratic
authoritarianism is no guarantee of rationality or better
judgment, as the South Atlantic War demonstrated.
B. OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
1. South American Conflict and the U.S.
a. Significance to U.S. Interests
The impact of a war in South America on the
United States is not immediately visible; the region is a
long way from the attention of the North American public, and
it is very unlikely that U.S. troops would be hazarded to
intervene in or terminate such a conflict, much less be one
of the original participants.
A more farsighted approach would consider the
direct and indirect economic and security consequences of a
war. In particular, the existing sizable debt burden of the
South American countries makes it desirable to maintain
stability in order to ensure our own and our allies' economic
well-being. The degree of integration of the world economy
at present would make it difficult for any war not to have a
significant effect worldwide, especially if the war involved
extrahemispheric actors
.
Security problems resulting from a war in South
America could include an opening for greatly increased Soviet
penetration, and a further distancing from the West by one or
by a number of nations--for example, Argentina and the
U.S.S.R., which have already developed strong economic ties.
This would significantly weaken the U.S. strategic position,
in particular if vital sea lanes or raw materials were
involved.
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Diplomatic options are rather limited since U.S.
leverage was eroded by the reductions in military training
and diminished role as an arms supplier, and Washington lost
much of its good faith as a mediator when it officially sided
with Britain in the South Atlantic War. U.S. preponderance
in the OAS remains a contentious issue, and few instruments
that could replace the past effective U.S. leadership role in
that organization exist.
b. U.S. Military Involvement
North American involvement in a South American
conflict is not likely to go beyond the diplomatic stage
unless some vital U.S. security interest is concerned. This
could be the case in the event of a clearly Soviet-sponsored
nation committing an unjustifiable aggression on a neighbor,
a situation not very likely at the present time. Even then,
U.S. aid would probably not go beyond providing arms or other
assistance not involving U.S. troops.
Unilateral military options are rather limited
and in any case could be counterproductive, especially if the
issues of the conflict are not clear-cut. Nonetheless, a
show of force with high-visibility assets such as the U.S.
Navy would be a distinct possibility to ward off any Soviet
intervention
.
On the other hand, an all-too-possible scenario
174IS the Non-Combatant Evacuation operation. The United
States Navy and Marine Corps, with the assistance of sister
services, are currently capable of handling an operation of
this type even against hostile local military forces,
assuming domestic U.S. political support for such an
operation could be obtained expeditiously; nevertheless,
costs and casualties could be high.
However unfortunate the analogy, deployment of
NEO forces would put the U.S. in the same situation as the
The Soviet Union carried out such an operation
amidst heavy fighting in Aden in 1985.
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Argentine junta and the British government in April of 1982:
any military action would have to be quick, decisive, and
successful. Such a scenario was possible in Grenada, where
the U.S. and allied forces were overwhelming, local
population support was ample, and the larger goals and
missions were well-defined; in one of the South American
nations, the specter of a Beirut or Viet Nam could too easily
be raised. Timely and concerted multilateral action by U.S.
forces as part of a widely accepted representative regional
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organization (if one existed), could greatly facilitate
all aspects of such an operation by enhancing the U.S.
political position; of equal importance, it would also allow
proximate basing and logistics support, as well as potential
allied military assistance.
2 . U.S. Policy for the Future
a. Revitalizing Regional Organizations
Latin America in general and South America in
particular were long considered a low-level U.S. policy
interest, which could be deferred or managed while
Washington focused on more pressing issues in Europe or Asia.
Although a substantial portion of U.S. trade was with Latin
America, relations were seen as part of the broader East-West
struggle rather than as an independent arena. While the
U.S. stressed the security side of the relationship, the
South Americans strove to highlight the social and economic
aspects; when Washington employed this latter perspective, it
was principally through concern over security issues, as in
1 7 fithe Alliance for Progress.
17 5 The United Nations was unable to meet on a timely
basis requirements for urgent action in the Sinai and in
Beirut in 1980 and 1982 respectively. Frank Gregory, The
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U.S. policy in the era since 1974 has been one of
discovering the limits of North American power worldwide, but
especially in the region that once seemed a U.S. preserve,
the traditional "backyard." The Falklands/Malvinas conflict,
with Argentina and then SELA repudiating the Inter-American
Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (TIAR) as a viable
interamerican organization, most recently brought this home.
These defections from the existing interamerican system
rendered the traditional role of the U.S. as chief player in
the OAS virtually meaningless. U.S. actions in Central
America and Grenada have shown that Washington is willing to
act in certain scenarios--although once again these actions
are very much East-West security driven and are subject to
severe fluctuations created by U.S. domestic disagreement,
and often to severe criticism from South America.
The Carter administration evaluated relations in
accordance with human rights and arms purchase records; the
Reagan administration has returned to a more pragmatic
approach, while still applying diplomatic pressure to effect
a maintenance of or transition to democracy. The new policy
has fallen short of its goals in part because it has not been
accompanied by a sizable credit outlay which might alleviate
the crushing economic situation in South America that poses
the greatest threat to regional stability.
Thus what is needed to help prevent conflict is a
revamped policy which addresses itself to economic problems
which threaten stability, without the ideological baggage of
the doctrinaire East-West approach: a regional (vice global
or even hemispheric) policy adapted to the special needs of
South American development in a democratic context and not
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merely to short-term security requirements . It would
require recognition of the changes in the relative standing
17 7 . ...Viron Vaky, "Political Change in Latin America: A
Foreign Policy Dilemma for the United States," Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs , Volume "TS KU~. 27
summet 1986, page 13.
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of countries since World War II, and the reflection of these
changes in reforms to existing instruments or creation of new
ones .
While the U.S. still remains the most powerful
nation in the hemisphere, some concessions would have to be
made to the realities of the changed international order and
the broadening of interamerican and extrahemispheric contacts
in the last two decades . Although a revamped Good Neighbor
Policy with assumptions of fictional equality is not called
for, limitations in U.S. power, commitment and capability
must be acknowledged; a cooperative approach, emphasizing
partnership rather than subordination, has the best chances
of success. The presence of the U.S. could act as a balance
to help overcome South American reluctance to make alliances
with unstable or potentially hostile neighbors, which has so
far hindered efforts at cooperation.
The implementation of this policy could be
handled by a body similar to the OAS, thereby providing the
U.S. once again with an opportunity for leadership in an
interamerican organization. Another example could be an
increased and public U.S. role in resolving the problems of
the South Atlantic War, with an eye to creation of a possible
"South Atlantic Treaty Organization" similar to NATO.
What of the multilateral force concept, as
employed in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada? The
development of a Regional Security Force equivalent in South
America would entail a great deal of political as well as
military risk; many South Americans would view it as another
interventory tool of the United States. U.S. action would
have to be in the context of a constabulary force, to avoid
being cast as partisan.
These policy options are not without their
difficulties; the governments of the South American nations
may find it politically troublesome to restore the closeness
of the ties they once shared with Washington unless they are
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certain that U.S. policy will be consistent, and that the
relationship will not be an excuse to restore U.S.
"hegemony." The desirability of an entangling alliance with
unstable countries is questionable for the U.S., especially
with the present limitations on U.S. exercise of power; the
alternative, however, of allowing a power vacuum in the
region, is equally unpalatable. The regional approach is
much harder to establish than bilateral arrangements, but the
benefits which could accrue from presenting a hemispheric
consensus are significantly greater than what most bilateral
agreements could provide.
b) Arms Transfer Policy
Washington's arms transfer policies have also
fluctuated significantly in the past two decades, from
excessive paternalism to idealism to relative pragmatism.
The competition in the arms market is here to stay, in large
part due to the image of unreliability which policy flip-
flops have created. The only possible advantage to be gained
by allowing the South American nations to obtain their arms
from an extrahemispheric supplier is that the weapons will be
so much more expensive that the recipient will be unable to
purchase enough or to use them effectively. The cost issue
is diminishing with the arrival of Brazil as a serious
contender in the arms manufacture and export business.
U.S. arms transfer policy must adapt to the new
environment if Washington intends to retain some leverage in
this area of relations. The greater threat to U.S. interests
and causal agent for war is more likely internal instability,
rather than armamentism. The major arms purchases have not
been the sole contributing factor to the current economic
chaos (Brazil, for example, despite its huge debt spent
proportionately modest amounts on armament) , although they
have undeniably aggravated the situation in some cases,
particularly Argentina and Peru. The nations that wanted
"advanced" weapons systems were not seeking state-of-the-art
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equipment, and frequently spent more than they would have,
and received more advanced materiel, than if the U.S. had
supplied them.
What is called for is not a policy of arming to
the teeth every military in South America with U. S . -provided
equipment; the current administration, though limited by aid
cuts and lingering recipient animosity, could use a balanced
policy of offering cheaper and less sophisticated products
than the ones available on the extrahemispheric arms market.
The current drawdown in the Defense budget thanks to the
Deficit Reduction Act may provide a large amount of surplus
materiel that if properly distributed would go a long way
toward reaffirming South American armed forces' confidence in
17 8
and ties with the U.S. military.
c. Conclusions
In an era of severe foreign aid cutbacks, such
policies may be the most viable given the long-term savings
which could be realized. A path to regional integration and
confidence-building measures would be opened which would
significantly enhance internal stability and democracy. The
policies would build up a reservoir of good will which could
help to increase the reliability of South American allies in
contributing to hemispheric security, while allowing the U.S.
renewed diplomatic and military clout in the region. At the
same time, they would allow the U.S. to compete more
effectively against the Soviet Union in an arena where the
Soviets are attempting to narrow a distinct strategic and
economic disadvantage.
17 8 As regards internal stability, the "big-ticket,"
high-visibility weapons systems designed for external
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